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Introduction

Of course anything ie possible in this world in v/hioh
wo live... but I say this ; th-j lik lihood that any
nation possessing these grout weapons of massive
destruction would use them in an attack, gPMI loss,
I believe that as thair underI think, every year.
standing of thr*a gro#s, then the less the chance that
they would go on an adventure that brought these things
into play, because as I see it, any such operation is
Just another way of oonuiltting suicide*
•••

. .

....Dwlght Eisenhower

*

What President cisenhowar was describing in a press ocnference in
February of 1967 was a phenomenon which has come to be called the nuclear
stalemate, u condition brought about by the existence of parity in weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union,

preventing them from ''launching all-out war because each can force the
other to pay an exhorbitant prioe for victory. "
"stalemate

w

The beginning of this

cocurred during the Truman administration in 1949, for in

signifying the
that year the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb,
end of the

African nuclear monopoly.

Uthln a few years, the Soviet

If it
Jnion possessed a retaliatory capability which equalled.

not surpass, that of the United States.

<.:id

As a result, a stalemate had

the destruction a
arisen in whioh neither state was willing to risk

nuclear war would bring.

recognUed a

Added to this was the f*ot that neither side

to
oonaelllnjr. oausus belli , and thus recourse

quoted in Kew
^-President Eisenhower, press conference,
February 7, 1967, p. 12.

%ttnry Ussinger, Nuclear Weapo™
V.oubleday, 1S57), p. 110.

major

Y

mm

lesgaod

rk Times,

Foreign Polloy, (Garden Cityi

2

However, because the Soviets retained the idea of the inevitable

triumph of Communism over capitalism, it was very unlikely that they

would abandon their expansionistic aims. The more likely course for the
Communists to take in their quest for world domination would be mainly

through non-military (economic, political, social) means and by military

aggression short of total war, "confining their aggression to places
and oiroumstanoes in which war would not jeopardize objectives of sufficient

immediate importance to warrant all-out retaliation..*"

3

The phrase

"non-military means military aggression short of total war" may refer
to indirect methods of diplomacy, economic pressures, propaganda, sub-

version, infiltration, insurrection, obstruction, planned mischief,

underground war, sabotage, intimidation, armed threats, limited war, and
war by proxy."4

It may even be indirect aggression where the USSR

does not even appear as & contestant, but supplies one side with materiel

and technical advice.

Although the ultimate objectives of Soviet policy are inflexible,
the tactics by which they may be achieved are very flexible and are

governed by a kind of opportunism
two forward.

—

one step baokward in order to take

The communists have shown this ability to retreat as well

ad advance many times in recent history.

They did it in Spain before

World War II, they were defeated in Greece in 1947, and they backed down
in Berlin in 1948.

In the words of one analyst,

"they have tried to

control the use of force because in most cases they have seen a specific

Robert Osgood, Limited

V'ar ,

(Chioagoi University of Chicago, 1957),

p. 6.

4Brigadier C. V. Barclay, as quoted in Theodore Ropp,
Modern ttorld, (Durham* Duke, 1959), pp. 380-81.

.Var

in the

3

advantage in the exorcise of restraint
Yet, the fact remains that the forces of Communism are a

,

war with

the Free World, through subversion, espionage and small scale war and

will remain so until their goals are achieved or they are defeated,
What this discussion is implying is that because of the existence of
the "nuclear stalemate * the Communist forces may not resort to total

war to aohieve their aims, but instead will use limited forms of aggression
in their struggle.

Karl von Clausewita in his treatise On ftf had indicated that war

need not always be total, but may at times appear in a limited form.
First, limited war would oocur whenever the political tensions or the

political aims involved were small.

In his words,

A war need not ...always be fought until one of the
parties is overthrown, and we may suppose that when
the motivies and tensions are weak, a slight, scarcely
peroeptable probability is in itself enough to move that
side to which it is unfavoraole to give .vay. Now, were the
other side convinced of this beforehand, he woulc;, naturally, strive for this probability only, instead of first
going out of his way to attempt to effect u complete
overthrow of the enemy* 6
T

the
It would appear that this condition has not been fulfilled during

present period sinoe political tensions are not "small" and the
over
Communist political aims involve the complete victory of communism

realized.
capitalism, with the struggle ending only when this aim is

very
However, Claueewitz's second oondition for limited war may

well be applicable to the situation faoing the world today.

According

William Kaufmann, "Limited War", in William Kaufmann, editor,
Military Policy and National Security , (Princeton:
Press, 1956), p. 103.

On ^ar , translated by 0. J. Matthijs Jolles,
Combat Forces Press, 1S53), p. 21 (Bk. I, Ch. II).

6 Karl von Clausewitz,

(Washington;

Princeton University

to Clauiarwitz *We see.. .that in wars in which the one side oannot

completely

i

isarn the other, the motives to peace will rise and fall on

both sides aocording tc the probability of future success and the

expenditure of force required. w?

This statement implies that war will

be United when the overthrow of the eneny oannot be conceived of or
oan be approaohed only in an indirect way.

Although this statement

was premised on tho insuf f ioienoy of the military means, it can also
be valid when the means may bo sufficient to overthrow the ene^y, but

would produce universal disaster,
is no viotory at all.""""

»7hat

"A viotory robbed of its meaning

oannot bo conoeived of is the oorupleto

protection of one's oountry, and as long as this condition exists,
possibility of total war (premeditated; is minimised.

the

The purpose of this paper will be to determine *hat effect the

above conclusions have had on American military strategists and politic*
leaders.
th«m«

It will mainly be a study of attitudes and the reasons behind

The proposition set forth is that in tho present period limited

war Is more likely to ooour than total war due to the "nuclear stalemate
and the inability of either cf the

t\to

opposing foroes to completely

insure its own protection so that it could successfully win a total war.

This implies that the United States, while maintaining an adequate
atomic retaliatory foroe to insure protection against total war, must
also bo adequately prepared to fight limited wars should they ocour.

7 Ibld «
8 "Li mited *art the prospects and possibilities. " Aray Information
found in
This idoa aay also
Digest, Vol. XIII. June, 1958. p.
"Clausewits," in Edward *eade Sari, inkers of modern

IU

fl.TUhfels.

109.
trategy . (rinoeton: Princeton -niveraity Press, 1844,; ?.

5

This proposition has become the subject of a heated debate within
military- and political circles and involves much mora than purely

strategic considerations.

As will be shown, it involves the desire

of the Armed Service to maintain their prestige and even build up their

own "empires."

The Air i-oroe has a vostad interest in securing funds

for total war preparation and maintaining its budget.

The /(ray and

*avy desire to have both a limited war and a total war capability.

This means a greater budget and more power for each.

The airoraft

industry and part of the missile industry have a vested interest in a
polioy for total war because of the defense contracts they reoeive.

The same holds true for the snail anas and tactical missile industries

which have a vested interest in a polioy designed to combat limited war.
Some companies may provide for both a total war and a limited war policy

and thus have an Interest in seeing that both policies are followed.

Politically the Democratic Congress uses defense policy as a partisan

weapon to attack the policies of the aepublioan administration.
Democrats may argue that not enou

.

h

The

has jsen done to combat limit od

wars, and thus the policies of the administration are inadequate.

This also involves a fight between Congress and the administration in

determining what constitutes an adequate defense posture.

At the

MM

time the administration recognises the need for defense against both

types of war and contends it

is

beinp aaintained.

In 1967 there began a rash of books and articles dealing with this

subject led by Henry "Kissingers hu clear Weapons and Foreign Policy and

Robert Osgood's Limited

.Var »

General (ret.) James Gavin's

These books have been followed by It.
var

and Peaoe in the Space Age (1958),

6

Oskar Mo rgen stern's The Question of National Defense (1959), and General
(ret.) itexwell Taylor's The uncertain Trumpet (i960).

These book*

have allotted a considerable response from public opinion and seem to

be the major Amerioan sources on limited warfare to this date.

Because

these authors tend toward generalities and make many value judgments,

the books do not present a true picture of the debate over limited war.

Furthermore, they present only one side of the debate— the limitod war
side.

Thus, in order to show a clearer picture of the attitudes of

the nation's polioy-aiakers on the subject of limited war, the Congress ional

Rooord , bervioe journals, popular periodicals, anu

x.hc

.iev

York Tines

will also oa used.
This paper covers the period 1957 to the Eisenhower budget message
for

i'

iscul Y ur 1961.

The 1957 date was chosen because it marks an

upsurge In the debate over defense policy centering around the necessity
of preparing to det 3r or to fight limited wars.

The 1960 date was

chosen as the other limit to the thesis because it

.ijarks

the last

Major effort by the present administration on the matter of defense.
Consequently, a brief history of the American attitude toward limited

war up to 1957 will be dealt with as a background to the study.
^s previously mentioneu, this will be priroarily a study of attitudes
and the often contradictory reasons behind them.

At the same tiaa

the difference batwsan words *nu deods must be noted, for often public

pronouncement is for public consumption only and is made for expediency's
sake.

An example of this is the iiffereuco between tho testimony of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Appropriations Committees of
Congress and their

stst tenants nw.de

in service journals - their own

'unofficial" views.

Xhere also say be differences between the attitude

of the administration toward the need to provide for limited war forces

and the aotual policy .

This will be analyzed by showing

first the

attitude of the administration and then by studying the defense budgets
for the f iaoul years 1959, 1SSQ, and 1361.

Congress.

The same will be done with

Because the inclusion of expenditures fcr space program

tends to complicate the debate, and since the spaoe program has been

taken out of the hands of the military and is still In the early stages
of development (as far as Lnaediate strategic use is concerned)* its

relation to limited war capabilities ana government policy vdll not be

dealt with thoroughly.
In concluding the thesis an attempt will be made to clarify the

position of American thinking and policy on the concept of limited war
in order to determine what effects, if any, the doctrine has had on

actual policy-, to ascertain why the administration has or has not adopted
limited war capabilities, and to decide what future action, if any, the

Government must take in order to remedy the situation.

In this respect,

it is hoped that this paper may hare some original value*

8

Chapter

I

The United States and Limited War

In the United State6 down to the earlier yeare of the 20th century

there had always been an intimate relation between war and domestic
politics.

In fact,

every war the United States had fought in the Western

Hemisphere was a limited war*

James Knox Polk in the mid-1840

1

s

"could

manipulate hiB war powers quite skillfully as a means of securing both
political and national objectives which seamed important to him,
For Iincoln the Civil

operation.

results.

lie

.Var

M*

was as much a political as it was a military

used military violence only to secure definite political

In the Spanish-American War, MoKinley was able to use war

as an instrument of politics and policy.

Var was.«.so

However, by Wilson's time

terrible and desperate a recourse that it could no longer

be used...»to achieve limited national aims or make good narrow aims
of foreign policy... It could only be taken up for the grandest of total

objectives,

such as

American demooraoy.

"making the world safe for democray" mm specifically,

This oan be said to have been a political aim,

but not in the same sense used by Polk or iicKinley who used war to gain

specific national aims.

The grand objectives desired by Wilson were

neither specific nor limited and thus are not comparable to the aims
sought by Polk or MoKinley.

Moreover, Wilson was forced to use policy

as an instrument of war, while Polk and MoKinley used was us an instrument
of polioy.

They had a definite policy in mind and willingly used war

to gain their ends.

Wilson was forced to go to war to achieve his desired

goals and thus his polioy became an instrument of the war itself*

^Walter Willis, Arms and tou (New York: New American Library of World
Literature, Inc. , 1356 J, p. 522.
£ Ibid.

9

The American people began to view war us a thing
la itself rather
than as the oontinuation of policy and diplomacy.

It became

something

to afcolleh, or If fangs*, a means of punishing an enemy who
had disturbed
the peaoe*

To American thinking war and peaoe became two diameterioally

opposed states and eaon was suspended durin.c the period of the other. 5

Much of this attitude was fostered by ^resident Wilson himself in Viorld
*«ar I.

Before 1917 he tried to get u permanent peace settlement and

sent his personal advisor. Colonel Edward House, on peaoe missions to

Europe in 1915 and 1915, but nothing came of the negotiations.

Again,

after his election in 1916, Wilson drafted a note appealing to the
belligerents to state the reasons for which they were fighting the war.
Germany replied, but the Allies were unwilling to state their own war
aims.

Then on January

::2,

1S17,

ilson ..uve his famous speech to the

Senate oalling for the establishment of a League of Nations to bring

about world accord and warning the belligerents that only "peaoe without
victory'' would bring a peraansnt settlement.

The speech furthered

«ilson*s leadership in the world, but had no effect on the belligerents,

especially the Allies, who could not afford a stalemate.*

This final

rebuke together with Germany's resumption of its policy of unrestricted
submarine warfare forced Alison to yield to the sword,
to the other extreme and attempted to

lie

then turned

et the war over as fast as

possible used the maximum of foroe on the grounds that total victory
was nooessary to make the world safe for cemooraoy.

It was an attitude

which, onoe the war was won, caused the American public to withdraw

^Osgood, op. oit >, p. 29.

*Thomus Bailey, A Dlplon^tic history of the Amerloan feople, (lew
York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, inc.] TJoO, pp. 535-56 and 640-41.

10

from the international scon© on the grounds that since victory was
complete, there

wuld

be no more war,

defensive, and prior to ^orld

«?ar

Military thinking became entirely

II American thinking was completely

in necorc *ith the idea that the United States ooula

rcmin

out of war

by hawing an impregnable defense.
It was HmtSJ

:

»ar II

which showed that the United States could not

keep herself isolated from world events, and it showed that American
security could be endangered by upheavals vVerseas.

character of Aorld

i»ar II

The crusading

instilled the idea of total victory into

laerioan strategic thinking along with approval of waging all-out
nuclear war.

After all, to

-v.-jrio

n thinking the -nited States possessed

the greatest military machine in the world at the end of the war, and

the atomic bombs dropped on Japan were the perfect reminder that the

United States had at last the ultimate weapon.

#ar was no longer viewed

as an instrument of polioy by the American people j it

was an end in

itself.
It has been claimed that American military thinking was actually

paralyzed by the atomic bomb, ana that
Vsorld Viar II

6

th<3

lessons to be gained from

were quiokly forgottan by the Truman administration.

The successes of the A-bombs in Japan seemed to validate the old

theory of strategic bombing

—

the actual success of which

Lii

.

ouhet

.orld

<«.r

II

was dubious,

Sjamos kavin, aar and ^eaoe in the Space Age , (Bew Yorkt Harper, 1958),
of tactical
pp. 92-112. Aaoa^ those lessons cited by G .vin were the use
air support and troop transport, airborne operations, amphibious operations,
carrier task force operations, and air mobility.
1

6

Beoau«o the Japanese conveyed peace overtures to the Russians in
April of 1945, there Is strong evidence that the war could huve been wen
without resort to the atomic bomb, and that it was really the destruction
Vinaoke^
of the Japanese merchant fleet that defeated Japan. See Harold
York; Appleton-Centurya History or the i^.r -^st in cd.srn
Croftes, Inc., 1950 J, pp.

This theory saw air power as strategic
enezny homeland,

—

*a mc-azse of

striking at the

where the target* would bo the civilian population and

productive plant, the very sources of military power, n7

Furthermore,

"the nation that developed the greatest air offensive poorer would win

(the next war), very likely in a matter of hours,*8
Thus the United States began to prepare for future wars by building

up a strong nuclear striking force.

In truth, this was a very feasible

and logical policy, for the Soviet Union was beginning to consolidate
its

v

>ias in uurope and *us looked upon as the prime threat to American

security.

The Truaan administration felt that it was not paralysed

by the atomic

bosab

but wis acting to deter further conquest by the

forces of Communism in the form of a surprise attack.

Furthermore,

through such moans as the Marshall Plan and the Truaan Doctrine, actual
uses of limited techniques to oosibat

CosEnunisai,

the administration was

trying to make Europe strong enough to resist the Soviet advances.
The specific military doctrine was actually incorporated into a foreign

policy of contining Communist expansion (although the administration
did net explicitly admit it).

The object of the policy was to

....keep the soviet sphere of control from expanding
bey one its postwar boundaries by building up local
situations of strength and by demonstrating a capacity
to moot force with counter force. 9

One of the sseans or aaaa^llahl&g this objective wus the deterranee
cf

voasuaiat agression by America's capacity to retail*^*

7 Roger

Hilaaan, "Strategic iioctrlnea for Limited
Kaufinann, op. cit ., p. 45.

ir,"

Inst

in William

8 Gavin, op. cit ., p. SS.

This was the original idea behind the
policy of containment deviaed by George F. Xennan.
6 0srood,

op. olt ., p. 142.

12

aggression by means of total war. 10

Lven though this was only on© of the

ways in which containment was to work, it tended to become
the principal
characteristic of American military policy prior to the Korean War,

although the Marshall Plan and the Truman Uootrine were examples of the
use of limited non-military techniques.

There

felt

several reasons for the success of the idea of relying

primarily upon air power.

The most frequently cited reason was the

threat of Soviet expansion, but there were other, more important, reasons

which were not as apparent as the Soviet threat.

Probably, the most

important of these reasons was the new-found power of the United States

Air Force, which had pained great prestige with the advent of the atomic
bomb and even had become a separate service in 1947.
brass were no* interested in placing the

footing with the other services.

iiir

Air Force high

Force on at least an equal

The success of the bombs on Japan

helped the Air force expand and started the groundwork for its later
rise to a position dominating the other services.

The aircraft industry

probably played an important part in this rise in an effort to secure

greater profits than it would have if a more flexible policy were
followed.

Such a policy offered smaller sacrifices for the average

citizen, and thus he felt that a large Air Force with fewer personnel

and huge weapons and preferable to a large standing Army and Navy.
Thus, by 1953 the Air Force had a personnel strength of 977,000 and a
m

budget of over $20 billion.

11

The other means to contain Communist advances were
meeting force with oounterforoe in a local and limited aotion, and
building situations of strength overseas through economic, technical,
and military aid.

^Ibid.,

p.

110 g

Encyclopedia Americana , (Washington: Amerioanna

^orp.),

Vol. 1,

p. 288.

Even as early as 1950, the Air Force had only 182,000 less

men than did the Army. 12
This policy was criticized by Secretary of State George Marshall,

who saw that the United States was increasing its commitments overseas

without providing for adequate forces to back them up, except for the
atomic retaliatory forces.

Aocording to him, "We are playing with fire

while we have nothing with which to put it out.* 13

Even he was not

without blame, however, as he played a key role in letting the China
"fire" get out of hand, as his negotiating mission failed.

Then in

1949 the explosion of the Russian atomic bomb led the United States
to build larger retaliatory weapons in order to stay ahead of the

Russians.

Thus, by 1950 the doctrines of total war and large scale

nuclear retaliation tended to be the major guiding forces in American
strategic thinking.
It was the Korean war which forced the administration to take

notice of the possibilities of limited aggressions occurring under the

umbrella of nuclear deterrents.

The war was a shock to the planners

because it defied all previous American strategic thinking.

The attack

did not come upon the United States, nor was it initiated by the Soviet

Union (directly).
perimeter.

Korea was not even included in the American defense

"Years of propaganda had pretty well convinced Americans

by 1950 that air power was the primary, if not almost the only, expressi
of modern military power."

lg

14

There was no doubt that the North Korean

Congressional Reoord , Vol. 105, pt. 13, p. 16788.

13 George Marshall as quoted in Millis, op, oit ., p. 282. A more
comprehensive statement of Marshall* s position may be found in James
Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries , (New York: Viking, 1951).
l4 Gavin, op. oit .,

p.

297.

14

invasion had caught the American Army completely
by surprise in spite
of intelligence reports concerning the threat
of *ar, for the amount
of troops and equipment in Korea had greatly
deolined since the end

of World Aar II.
In spite of the fact that American strategic
thinking was geared
to fight total, all-out wars,

tiie

administration did resort to limited

war, since the issues at stake were not viewed as
being great enough
to justify total war.

The administration felt, contrary to the wishes

of General MacArthur, that the war should not spread beyond
the boundaries

of Korea itself, and thus the idea that it was feasible to fight
limited

war began to take hold in administration oiroles.
*ith this in mind a study known as "Projeot Vista" 16 was undertaken
under government sponsorship to conduct a broad study of ground and
taotioal warfare in order to improve the country's capacity to fight
limited wars.

The results of the study, formulated by Dr. J. Robert

Oppenheimer, were a desire to bring the battle back to the battlefield,
as it was felt that the more dangerous problem facing the United States

was not general war but limited war.

Thus the recommendations of the

study sought to improve the United war capabilities of each of the

services, 4

'

There has been no official mention of the results of the

study, but it is signif io&nt that the administration thought enough of

the implications of the Korean

>V&r

* 5 Projeot

to initiate such a study.

Vista was undertaken at the California Institute of
Technology in 1951 under the auspices of the Army, Wavy, and Air Force
to conduct a broad study of ground and tactical warfare.
It was ohairei
by Cr, Lloyd Dubridge and consisted of Bra, William Fowler, Robert B&oher,
C, C. Furaass* Charles Lauristen, Clark illikan, J, Robert Oppenheiasr,
and H, ?• Robertson,
16 Gavin op, cit
,, pp. 131-35,

™
15

The Korean War showed tho defense planners that the Cotonunista
could and *ould resort to measures less than total war to achieve limited
ends, and the United States showed that It was capable of meeting such

*6£re»eion on liaited terms without expending its total productive
resources.

Yat, after the Korean War the administration indicated that

the prime threat to American security was still that of a surprise attack

by the Soviet Union* and policy was geared to meat this threat,

further-

more, in 1954 when Secretary of State Dulles indicated that massive

retaliation would be the prime factor in American defense policy, he
ignored the need for a strategy of flexibility to meet the Communist
threat.

In a speech on January 12, 1954, he declared;

So long as our basic policy oonoepts were unclear, our
military leaders could not be selective in buildin,
our military power. If an enemy could pick his time
and place and method of war fare—and If our policy was
to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by
direct and local opposition—then *re needed to be
ready to fight in the Arctic, and in the Tropics j
in Asia, the Near East, and in Suropoj by the sea,
by land, and in the air* with old weapons and with
new weapons....

3ut beforo military planning oould be changed,
the Resident and his advisers, as represented by
the national Security Council, had to take some
basio polioy decisions. This has been done.
The basic decision was to depend pri-uarily upon
a freat capacity to retaliate, instantly, by
juans and at places of our own choosing. New the
fepartaect of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
can shape our military establishment to fit what is
our policy, instead of having to try to be ready
to meet the energy's choices.

John foster Dulles, quoted in

Jte-jr

York ibaes, January 13, 1954, p.

?•

16

Out of this statement grew the doctrine of tussive retaliation

and the military policy known as the

Htw Look*"

The aim of this

policy was to place a greater emphasis on the use of atomic retaliatory
power and reduce conventional forces.

According to Secretary of Cefenae

Charles Wilson in tfaroh of 1954:

••the integration of new weapons into military planning
oreates new relationships between man and materi41 which
oiaphasites air power and permit overall economies in
the use of manpower*
The fisoal year 1956 budget incorporates the new
air force objective and continues a rapid buildup
of air strength, and the creation, toaintenace, and
full exploitation of modern air power. ..

As we incre ase the striking power of our combat
forces by the application of technological advances
and new weapons and by the continuing growth of
air power, the total number of military personnel
can be reduced.*®

This was a policy primarily dependent upon massive retaliation oap-

abilities at the expense of forces to meet looal aggression.

It also

followed the policy of Secretary of State Dulles, a policy v^hich
ignored flexibility to meet all threats.

This policy also implied

that future wars would be fought in the air and there would be no
snore land

wars such as vorea and Indochina,

rurthermcre, the attitude

of tfilson was that by building up forces for deterring all-out war,
the capability to fight liaited war would also be created.
;Iowever, Admiral Radford, a staunch believer in massive retaliation,

had stated earlier that the United States still had to be prepared to

fight "lMMff military actions short of all-out war," and President

Lisonhower assured planners that local wars could be waged on the

Charles Wilson, quoted in *0* York 1 lives , ^aroh 16, 1964, p. 1.
1S Adniral Charles Radford, Mew York Times , December 13, 1953,
IV,

p. 5.

i
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"fringe or periphery of our interests.

,,2

°

Thus, although the first

priority was placed upon retaliatory forces, limited wars were postulated
as a definite strategic possibility.

presented

l

Then the National Security Council

report in 1955 in which "recognition was given for the

first time to the possibility of a doctrine of mutual deterrence and
the importance in suoh a period for the United States to have versatile,

ready forces to cope with limited aggression.

?]

In 1966 General Taylor as Army Chief of Staff proposed the adoption

of a new military program by which the United States could maintain
the capacity to fight limited wars and at the same time maintain an

effective and credible deterrent to all-out war.

The program called

for forces speoially equipped to meet either contingency, an adequate

atomic deterrent, foreign military and eoonomio aid to countries to

build up their indigenous forces, and the application of graduated force.

According to General Taylor this program #ould be suitable for flexible
application to unforeseen situations and thus could not be geared to
any one single weapons system, strategic concept, or combination of
allies 22

What this amounted to was a policy of containing the

Communist threat by being ready to oppose aggression Vith a variety
of means under a variety of circumstances".

23

to fight limited war as well as general war.

This included a capacity
It also meant a capacity

2-Wxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet , (New York: Harper, 1959),
pp. 22-27.

22 Ibid., pp. 31-37
23 0sgood,

op. cit ., p.

235.
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to deter the enemy from starting 1 baited wars, or to win them
quickly

in order to prevent a *.)iooe::teal attrition or involvement in an expanding

conflict which may ?ra* into the general war we want to avoids
Thie policy closely paralleled statements made by President Eisenhower
and members of his administration since 1966.

Yet it *as used by

General Taylor as a criticism directed toward administration policies.
Certain factors enter into thie apparent discrepancy.

One is that

there may be a difference between public statements made by administration

officials and their true feelings and actual policy decisions.

On the

other hand, criticise of the Administration's policy from service chiefs
could result from the desire to protect their own "empires" and the

prestige of their services*

criticisms were

| aided

There is also the possibility that the

by pure strategic considerations.

What is more

than likely is that this discrepancy is a result of all three factors.
Thus, from the end of

<orld War II through 1856 American military

strategy was formed under the

thusab cf air power and in the

belief

that a policy of massivo retaliation was sufficient to deter any
tt£*

rossor from waging all-out

WU

on the United States.

It was felt

that such a policy would also prevent the outbreak of any local or
limited war.

Such a policy was satisfactory totthe Air iorce, since it

relied primarily upon air po;*er, and it was favored by the administration,
since it offered a chance to eoono:.i^e in the defense budget.
true of the Truman administration up to the Korean

Eisenhower administration from 1953 to 1957.

>»ar

This was

as well as the

Criticism oasa mainly from

the Army and Navy, which felt that they were being flighted, and from

Democratic Congressmen and Senators In their attacks on the Republican

administration from 1953 to 1957.

Taylor, loo* alt .

Chapter II
The Debate on Limited W&r
The Armed Services
1

The period 1S57 to the present has been marked by the continuance
of a heated debate in the Pentagon, the administration, and Congress

over the status of American military strategy.

In this age of mutual

nuolear stalemate the fear of nuclear devastation tsnde to impose a
decree of caution upon the protagonists, forcing thes to weigh carefully

the risks involved in starting a nuclaar holocaust.

For this reason

the capability of raassive retaliation is essential to any defense or
security policy.

Such a capability includes long range boabers and

ballistic missiles, military bases at homo and overseas, mobile naval
talk foroes, tactical aircraft and troops, and a multiplicity of weapons,

Essentially, it is a doctrine of defense power

—

the ability to strike

baok at the enemy with such destructive foroe that he will be deterred
fro:n

launching an attack.

This is essentially the military policy

followed by the United States at this time.
let it can be added that the ability to deter the Soviets from

starting a general war by having a defensive force of long-range nuolear

firepower is not enough to detsr then from starting small limited wars.

What is needed are foroes oapable of meeting all kinds of threats.
1
must be able to deliver a big punch or a gentle tap."

*»e

Such a capacity

wars to gain
la needed because the enemy may resort to small, limited
his ends.

Xhis type of conflict does not involve the use of the nuclear

Hanson Baldwin,

Nev;

York llnies , August 18, 1957, p. 68.

retaliatory foroe because the objectives sought at the time are
not
great enough to justify the unleashing of these foroes.

The ohief

point made by the supporters of this view, namely the Army, Navy, and
the Democratic members of Congress, is that we have been increasing our

power to deter the Communists from starting a general war by building
up our nuclear retaliatory capacity at the expense of our conventional

capability, while the Soviets have been increasing their nuclear capacity

without weakening their conventional capability.
This has been the view held by the officials of the U # S, Army and,
recently, the Navy,

In January of 1958 Secretary of the Army Wilber

Bruoker testified before the House Armed Services Committee that in
his mind there was no doubt that the Soviet Union was planning a series
of "nibbling" wars, since they were maintaining an army of 2.5 million

men*

"What they are going to do," he testified,

"is keep nibbling away,

as they have in the Mid-East, foment trouble in Indonesia and Syria and

these other places around the world, and one by one drag them under the
Iron Curtain by hook or crook. .Unless we have a force ready to drop
or get in there and do something about it, that is the best way to start
2
one of those global things."

This same opinion was also expressed by

General Jiaxwell Taylor when he was Army Chief of Staff.

He declared

that "our (the Army's) major concern, of course, is to prevont war.

But

if the Communists are not convinced that we will fight if necessary,

our deterrent becomes invalid.

If we demonstrate our readiness to use

effective force to put down local aggression, it will give credulity
to our general war deterrent posture.

Thus, while we should never

2

Wilber Bruoker, quoted in New York Times, January 25, 1958,

p.

2.
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seek limited wars, we must bear in mind the broud significance of our

reactions to limited aggression in terms of communicating our will and

determination to the potential foe," 5
At no time have
tory capacity. 4

Artay

They

officials denied the need for a nuclear retalia-

bcliev;.-

that we now have an "overkill" capacity

(the ability to destroy Kussian cities many times over) in the use of

nuclear retaliatory weapons.

As long as we can destroy a city with one

bomb or missile, it is not neaessary to have five or six to do the same
Job, they reason.

What is needed is to divert funds from the massive

retail lation field to strengthen the capability to fight non-nuoloar war
or to create small tactical siae (short range, "clean") nuclear weapons

that would have only local and limited effects and would not incur the

danger of spreading the war, 5
Moreover, General Taylor hat pointed out that these wars need not
be short nor small.

According to him, "by striking a statistical manpower

balance of all 17 limited wars (since 1945? see chart on page 25a) one
findi that they have averaged about

SOqpOO men engaged.

2:,

years in duration and nearly

Often significant military effort has been required

to bring these limited wars to an end.

Following this line of thinking Major General John Daley, the

Array 1 s

director of special weapons, has suggested that the 'suicide" aspects of

^Maxwell Taylor, "On limited war," Army Information digest Vol. XIII,
June, 1956, p, 4,

Secretary 3ruoker testified before the Senate Armed Servioes Conmlttee

retalin January. 1358# "While all of us recognize the primacy of nuclear
iation as the major deterrent to general war, we must not, in our seal to
provide this capability, neglect to meet the force requirements for
limited war," New York limes , January 23, 1958, p, 1,

°hanson Baldwin,
6

&m

York Tjnoo, May £5, 1358, p. 28

Maxwell Taylor, "Improving our capabilities for limited war,
Infornation -ifoet . Vol. 14, February, 1969, p. 3.
•

*

Army_

thermonuclear weapons might cause a new oonf liot to follow the
pattern of
World War II.

war ooourring

Thus, he has arrived at the possibility of three
types of

—

"total thermonuclear war, limited war, general war of

great extent involving atomic weapons but still not thermonuclear
megaton
suicide, the oomplete exchange of nuclear stockpiles." 7

Like General

Taylor, General Daley also pointed out that limited wars need not be
small.

In General Daley's mind the big war involving nuolear weapons

and huge foroes but not resulting in thermonuclear suioide is the type
of war most often overlooked.

According to him,

"a

nation prepared for

a little limited war or the Armageddon of thermonuclear war could still

be ruined by this general war particularly if the nation failed to

provide for the mobilization of reserve strength in time of crisis." 8
The Army has acknowledged that the United States has forces designed
to meet all these threats.

In the area of general war,

General Taylor

has cited the atomio retailiatory bomber and missile foroes, continental

air defense foroes, the Navy's anti-submarine warfare foroes, and civil
defense.

These foroes are necessary but do not contribute to a capability

for fighting limited war in his view.

In this area (of limited war)

the United States does have impressive assets including the Tactical

Air Command,^ the Navy's carrier forces, the strategic air and sea lift
forces, and most of the Army and all of the Marines.* 0

7 Major

8

Aocording to

General John D^ley, quoted in New York Times , July 4, 1960, p.

Ibid .

^Aocording to the Brigadier General Clifton von Kann (Director of
Army Aviation), "If there is one Air Foroe program that the Army is
The Army holds that the TAC mission is one of
it is TAC.
dedicated to
the most important in the military establishment." ^rmy, flavy, Air Force
Journal vol. XCVII, October 31, 1359, p. 2,

—

10

Maxwell Taylor, "Improving our capabilities for limited war.
Information uigest, vol. 14, February, 1359, pp. 4-6.

„

Army

3,

General Taylor the Army was determined to support emergenoy operations

uoh

as Lebanon through the Strategic Army ^orps, a foroe specially

designed to meet the "initial requirements* of limited or general war

anywhere in the world.

Ihis force could also be reinforoed by redeploy-

ment of forces already overseas.

However, in his opinion "such redeploy-

ment of our overseas foroes weakens their capabilities in thd areas

from which they are deployed at tho very
increased.

tiiae

that world tensions are

Hence in rnany cases it would be necessary to repla.ee them

by additional foroes from COSUS (Continental united States)"

1

This would necessitate a larger standing A nay with adequate modern

weapons.

In order to meet this condition General I jylor outlined a five

point program in »id-195S in order for the country to meet more effectively
the possibilities of limited war.

These five points included! 1) moderni-

sation of military equipment applicable to limited war situations,
2)

improvement of the strategic mobility of limited war foroos,

3/

the

pre-planned use of air and sea lift necessary to move these foroes,
4) an expanded program for joint planning and training of the elements

of limited war forces, and b) pablio recognition of our increased

capability or u* r in w with the '"challenge" of limited war.
prorrai:.,

1?

Such a

he f«slt, wouli zreatly add to the nation's assets for fighting

limited war and would add oredulity to the deterrent posxur* of the

country.
In order to aalce the Army an efficient fighting force with Htf

conventional
ability to fight general atomic war or limited nuclear or
11
x/ef ens

12

war a reorganisation of the Army's structure was
undertaken in 1957.
The key element in this reorganisation was the
battle group

down regiment) in the new division structure.

(

a scaled

These battle groups would

be administratively self-contained units thus enabling a
wide dispersal
of units on the offense and defense.

Such a struoture was necessary to

prevent the appearance of massed targets to the enemy on
the battlefield.
The four major principles in this new structure were:

l) the ready

adaptability of units to the requirements of the atomic battlefiled,
2)

the pooling of higher echelons of command,

control, 4) the adaptability of new equipment.

3)

an increased span of
The new infantry division

was souled down to 13,748 men (previously 17,460) with five battle
groups.

Eaoh battle group was to contain five rifle companies equipped

with mortar 8 and armored personnel carriers, a unit of light tanks, and
assorted light artillery.

The division also maintained a tank battalion,

a transport battalion, and assorted artillery inoluding 105 mm. howitzers,
8

inoh howitzers, and Honest John rockets.

Thus the Army's infantry

division could be used in part to oope with situations short of general
war and also be adaptable to the requirements of general war.

The same

could be said of the armored division which declined in strength but

received more airoraft.

It

was believed that armor would play an

increased role in nuclear warfare because of its mobility and the

protection afforded by armor plate from blast and fallout.

The airborne

division beoame completely air transportable using only one-half the
lift of the old division.

13

In this way the Army felt it would have

the forces necessary to meet all military situations.

This opinion was

13

"Army describes new pentomio division.
Journal, vol, XCIV, Maroh 30, 1957, pp. 1-2.

Army, Navy, Air Force

*
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euafcied

Arsay

up by General Bruoe Clark, the commanding general of the Continental

Comand, who stated:
Our preparedness program Is designed for multiple
posibilities
not chained to a single concept of the
enemy's intentions, ffe are preparing to survive an
attempt at a nuclear knock-out and fight on with whatever air and navel support reiaains. We are preparing
for a general war
one in which our national survival
is directly at stake. And we are preparing to win the
ultimate battle of euoh a war on the ground where people
liva.
are preparing to snuff out bruahfire wars
before they can gain ground , gravity or intensity. And
we are seeking the modern sea and air lift to answer an
alara anywhere in the world. 4

—

—

Thus, according to the Army all kinds of war are possible* and the

Army has to be prepared to meet them all.

Seneral Bruoe Clark, ^Limited war: where do they stand?',
Army, Navy, Air Foroe Register and defense Tines , vol. 80, J!ay, 23, 1959,
p.

?4.
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since 1945

Forces involved in 1000 »B

Date

.Vur

1. 1946-47

Indonesian

Total
titfp

Neth*

Indo.

14U

2.

1245-49

Chinese Cirll Har

ChXats

Ch^om.

3.

1946*54

Malayan Aar

UX

Coirta,

If!
I/O

1146*49

Creek

Greece

Rebels

cl 1

1947-4S

Kashmir

India

Fkkie.

Franca

ytetit.

Israel

Arabs

01

Co^nnu

^and Voroea

140

XOOO
IS

•

5.

Viar

i

isputo

6. 1946-64

Indoohlna 3ar

7. 1948-49

Arab-Israeli

3 or

140

loOC

lo?2

160

10

mi
191

*%

Q7

son

Korean

1964

Guatemala Revolt

Govt •

Rebels

1C. 1955

Argentine Revolt

Govt

Rebels

16

11. 1953-68

Algerian Insurrec*

France

Rebels

12. 1956

Sinai Campaign

Israel

13. 1956

HUffSe Sues Seiaure

14. 1957

£70

c
?0

oo

OcO
iU u

U JW£a

1950-53

e.•

130

DO*«

Tic.*

40

15

5

490

so

WW

30

^gypt

80

35

60

35

UX-Fr.

£*;ypt

99.5

35

60

35

Musoat-Ctean

OK

Rebels

2.4

0.3

1.6

0.3

16. 1956

Bulgarian ^uypres.

Rebels

USSR

40

80

40

70

16. 1956

Taiwan Straits

US-Ch«. Ch.C.

200

195

88

135

17. 1953

Lebanon-Jordan

US-JJK

Rebels

ra

\m

16

11

18. 195S-59

Cuba

B,tlsta

Castro

43

6-8

35

6-8

•

**ar

•

1 1

7ft

5

Chart presented by Secretary of the A r my VJilber firuoker and made public
;tgv;
I i.:^s 0 January 23, 1859, p. 7»
i.:
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The attitude of the 'Jnitoa States Havy toward limited war has

undergone

setae

changes during the period 1367-1359. As long as

Admiral Arthur Radford was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the

Irnvy

supported the policy of massive retaliation.

According, to

Admiral Radford thore was no ohan*re in the world situation in 1957 j

there was no nuolear stalemate,

"There has been no change in concept.

The basio problem has not changed.
to win it as soon as possible.

If you hare a little war, you want

You don't want to drag it out."* 5

This attitude changed with Admiral R^dforJ's retirement, which
left Adrairai isrloi^h Burke as the only

of Staff.

SJavy

me ruber of the Joint Chiefs

Admiral Burke, together with General Randolph UeC Pate

of the Marines and most of the naval staff, have been strong supporters
of the need to build forces capable of coping with limited war situations.

Like the Army, the liavy has maintained the importance of having forces
to deal with general war.

According to Vice Admiral !«

Deputy Chief of Saval Operations,

as a nation we have no alternative

but to aaintain the ability to det.r aa^or nuclear war.

element must be

u.

V. Davis,

The primary

capability for rapid and oertain retailiation which

no enemy can persuade himself that he can stop, either by perfecting
hie defenses or by surprise attach on our scans of affective retaliation.

Severtheleea, the Navy has offered criticisms of the nuclear

retaliatory buildup.

?t«e Admiral

I

<*vis

voiced the opinion that

Ve

also provide the means of deterring cr defeating local aggression.

Mattel Arthur Radford, news conference,

jg

York Time* ,

August 16, 1SS7, ?. £•
16

Vice Admiral

vol. 42,

!<«

«

JCllj

V. Davis, "The Savy in limited
?•

(Wi

w*r%

Ordnance,

oust

To this we must provide weapons, and techniques of
delivering them,

which will not result in the expansion of the limited action
into something larger and more serious," 17 This would require in his
opinion a
versatile foroe which oould use nuclear or conventional weapons and
could get to the seene quickly.
same opinion.

Admiral 3urke has often expressed the

He has stated before the defense subcommittee of the

House Appropriations Committee,
power and

I

thinic

capability. m18

"I

think we do have too muoh retaliatory

that we should put more money into limited (war)

Later in an adcrese before the Kaval

.sar

Col la go in

April of 1959, Admiral Burke criticized our nuoloar build-up as a means
of preventing both general and

United wars.

He stated that the "pre-

paredness for all-out attaok has been 'over-aocomjlished.*

What is

needed is to widen our sights for adequate preparedness against the more

probable oourses of action that fall far below the flash point of general

war.***

A« Secretary of the flavy, Thoaas Gates had also maintained the

need for a military strategy oapable of meeting all contingencies.

In

a speeoh before the Navy League in &Ly, 1959, he declared that a major

war was unthinkable because of the huge destruction it would cause,
thus openin.

the way for limited Coxanunist aggressions.

In his words,

"•••we should drive home to the other services and the public the real

possibilities of limited war and of the inevitable continuance of the
cole war.

People in all places should be made aware of the unchanged

17 Ibid.
18

Admiral Arloigh Burke, quoted in New York Times , *aroh 31, 1959, p. 1.
Admiral Burke as quoted in

jg

York Times, April 8, 1959, p. 6.

re

Communist objectives for world domination* of their plana to create
chaos and disorder, and of their attacks against weak spots, aspeoially

against rising new and unoosmeltted nations.
the

'*asrj ,

The deployed fleets of

together with tiieir esaborked and ready Sarine landing forces,

are the nation's most evident and affeotivo response."
The iiavy has also demanded the funds to get into the game of

providing forces for both general and limited war»
Navy realises that the stakes in the game ore high.

Wot

the Army, the

They include the

costly attack carrier striking forces, sea lift forces, the submarine
fleet, the Solaris and other missiles, and the maintenance of the Marine
Corps,

.

Of these programs the carriers, sea lift, and Marines have added

implications for limited war.

*hs

i-iavy

thinks of the attack carrier

striking force as a means of fighting nuclear war (as part of the nuclear

detorrent with the Strategic Air ^omaand of the

Mr

force) and of

fighting local war with nuclear or conventional weapons.

For

1 baited

wars the light attach aircraft carrier, the old £sses class, would be
used.

According to Vice Admiral Davis, "the light attack aircraft

carriers are equipped to carry all our air-to-surface weapons except
the larger nuclear weapons.

The burden of close air support, interdiction,

and other Halted war missions will be carried cut largely by (their)
aircraft, 1,21

The carrier striking force has also been pushed by Arairal

Burke, who sees it as
the threats of

'"the

Halted war

logical

ready-

military force to counter

c
in many areas of the world."

But he has

Air
Gates, "Limited won where do they stand?", Amy, ^uvy.
34-T5.
Force Begister and defense TLaes , vol. 80, Boy 25, 1969, pp.

Thomas

21

Vice Admiral Davis, oo. olt« , p, 804.

22

Army. ::avy, -ir I-oroe Journal, vol. ICVI, January 31, 1969, p.

»•

29

also MainWtedtrie need for modernizing these f cross.

3| stated that nost

of these carriers *ould be obsolete by 1966 and new o&rriars sould bo
needed, since

%

*wo

will eontinuo to need carriers in the future for

Halted war just as has boon ropoata&ly demonstrated in the past
years , and the need will

b-3

urgent , just as it has in the past*"

An integral part of the Savy
Sarin© Corps.

fm

'

s

forces to combat liiaited war is the

The isarine Corps has of course, supported the need for the

attack oarrier strike force, since the Serines are the ground forces to
be deployed in liiaited war situations.

General Pate, Marine Corps Chief

of Stuff, has supported this force; he sees amphibious foroes as the

beet means to meet the limited war threat,

i*e

wants the country to

plaoe its main reliance upon "a&ritine" strongth to meet liaited war

situations. This would involve using, the S3a as a base, relying on landing

forces where the Wftj their logistic substance, and their fire support
are all packaged and ready in ships, and are lau-ohed upon our enemy from

the ocean, in the strength and form demanded by

-.he

specific situation.

JM

The advantages of this type of force would be that it would not require
costly oversees -bases, it can lose itself in the ocean and remain unto
undeteoted and unoomaitted, and it could move silently and secretly

trouble spots.

26

Brigadier General ttichard Lmngrua (Marine Corps Chief

helioopterborne ilarine
of operations and Plans) has also stated that the

backed by Marine
landing teams armed with four kinds of miesilee and

2 * lb id *

^General Kandolph
Arsy. Kary. Air Force
p.

itl
£5 Ibid.

JtoC

Pate.

Regl^r

"How can we cope with limited
1959,
and Defense Times, vol. 30, November 28,

jet fighters have given the Marine Corps a

f,

new capability" to meet

limited war threats. 26
Thus the #avy and Marine Corps have joined the debate on the side
of those who favor preparing an adequate capability to meet the threat
of limited war,

Suoh a capability would give the Navy more oarriers

V

and troop transports, more aircraft, more missiles.

It would give the

Marines greater personnel strength, better weapons, and more aircraft.
For both it means a greater budget and more prestige and power.

Hence,

for both services it is the obvious side to take.

26

Brigadier General Richard Mangrum, Army, Navy, Air Force Register ?
vol. 79, January 11, 1958, pp. 3 & 22 0

31
5
To the United States Air Foroe the most formidable throat to

Aaarlean security is posed by the intercontinental nuclear wis s ilea
and manned aircraft of the Soviet Union.

Thus

African

lon?r-range air

power, the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union completely, is the best

deterrent and the best means of preventing Russian aggression anywhere.
As General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, has expressed it,
*the Soviets have been constrained mm not by the US battalions and shijs
and tactical aircraft that we deployed

—

but oonstrained to the great

decree by the established capacity of Ameriaan long-range air power,
lie

has also stated that "the United States must be capable of destroying

the military power of the enemy.

our deterrent posture.

This capability is the foundation of

This is the only thing that will deter the Soviets

from taking aggressive action against our allies and from launohing a
28
devastating nuolear attack against the United States."

point

;

In his view-

rategic Air Command is the "primary deterrent force,"

followed by the air defense forces as the next important element in the
strategic concept. The least important element, in his opinion, is the

tactioal air force. The Air Poros has a great stales in maintaining a

policy of combating the genaral war threat.
bombers, missiles, and funds.

It involves manpov/er,

Thus, to the -^ir rorce the polioy of

exclusive aassiv© retailiation is still valid, and the first priority Is
the
to deter the Soviets from launching a surprise nuolear attaok on

United States.

Budgetary considerations thus place limited war forces in

a lower priority.

Committee
^Goneral Thorns white, testimony before Senate Araed Services
Mtw York Times , January 28, 195S, ?. 1.
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Furthermore, the Air Force feels that there is no need to prepare

separate foroes to fight limited

mrs*

Aooording to Secretary of the

Air Force James Douglas, "the fundamental Air Foroe task is to maintain
in-being forces of tho slae and effectiveness to deter general war.

In

these forces laaintained to meet general war requirements, there is a
powerful and effective capability, adaptable aa appropriate, to meet
such limited war situations as may oocur."

view formulated by Charles .Vilson in 1954.
toward limited war did not change

frota

29

This is the old point of

Thus the Air Force attitude

1964 to 1959.

It was also the

point of view of General Kathan Twining ^hen he was Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

His attitude was that between the extremes of

total nuclear war and "subversive political activity" there were a large

number of military und "quasi-military* choices open to the Communists.
One of these choices could be limited war.
had to bo recognizee- but in his opinion,

Es emphasised that this threat

the United States capabilities

for local or limited war derive in large part from these required to
deter or firht a general war.

The type of air and sea forces required

to oontrol the air and sea lines of communication in general war, in

largo 3oale aggressions in the Far
•cid-o st,

E.,st,

in Southeast r.sia, or in the

are also necessary for effectual reaction to smaller scale

50
aggression."

The same thing has been Bald by General White, tho Air

Force Chief of Staff, who has stated that an "essential aspect of our
total g .--neral war force is its inherent limited war capability.

Air toroe has, within its resources,

.

The

designed its structure to provide

^James Douglas, "Limited wan where do they stand? " Army. Ha vy, Air
Foro© Register and lefense Ti&ae , vol. 80, Hay 23, 1359,

m&rw*

B&Ty*

Mr Eof

p.

25.

Journal, vol, XCVI, January 3:, 1969, p. 31.
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the desired general war strength plus a capacity to fight successfully
in limited war." 31

Although the attitude that limited war is possible exists in Air
Force circles, there seems to be a divergence of opinion as to the use
of air power.

There are two schools of thought on this subject in Air

Force circles as reported by Colonel I* H. Hampton, Deputy for Evaluation,

Air War College*

In his view one school believes

r

that in limited war

situations air power can establish conditions that would either be deoisive
in themselves and thus preclude the need for surface operations or that

would establish conditions so favorable as to make successful exploitation
of results by surface forces a foregone conclusions*

seems to believe

The other school

"that in limited weir the role of air power forces,

specifically the Air Force, should be one of primarily supporting surface
aotions and exploiting surface operations."

33

The actual Air Force view

seems to be a combination of both of these schools of thought with the

former having somewhat more influence on Air Force policy.

For the purpose of dealing with limited wars the Air Foroe has
created a Tactical Air Command.

The Command contains aircraft necessary

to perform the variety of air tasks needed in limited war operations*

According to General 0. P. Weyland, former oommander of TAG, the purpose
behind TAG was to tailor an air foroe to meet any limited war threat and
eliminate this threat through the use of air power.

He stated:

"We

believe timeliness and quick reaotion are of the utmost importance.

31

Army, Mavy, Air Force Journal , vol. XCVI, November 1, 1958, p.

32 Colonel

"Unlimited confusion over limited war",
Air University Quarterly Ueview , vol. IX, Spring, 1967, pp. 44-45.
S5

Ibid.

§< H. Hampton,

3

Generally speaking, the average small, friendly oountry whloh is a
possible target for local aggression has a capability for effective

ground fighting, but few have an appreciable taotioal air capability.
If they know they will bo supported quiokly, they may be depended upon

to fight in defense of their country." 34

This point of view is similar

to the school of thought advooating the use of air power in limited war

chiefly to support ground forces.

The opposite opinion has been voiced

by General <7hite who believes that as the Army develops its atomic
weaponry, it reduces the close air support functions of the Taotlcal
Air Foroe, thus leaving it the role of conducting deoisive limited air

war campaigns*

35

Beoause the Air Force believes that the Communists will concentrate
in areas where the United States has no deployed forces, a program known
as the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) Concept was devised whereby

the 19th Air Force

v/as

established to conduct "on a continuing basis

timely studies of all areas of the world in which possible limited
conflict might be forced upon members of the Free World**

According

to Major General Henry Viccellio, commander of the 19th Air Foroe, the

idea of the Composite Air Strike Force was bora beoause "the United

States oould not afford to station forces in being on a permanent peacetime basis in every locale, sufficient for any eventuality.

But a small,

54

General 0. P. Weyland, "Taotioal Air Power*, Ordnance
March-April, 1958, p, 801 •

vol,,

42,

"

55

36

Army, Kavy, Air Force Journal vol, XCIV, August 10, 1967, p. 3.

General 0. P. Way land, "Composite Air Strike Foroe", Amy, Navy, Air
Force Journal vol, XCV, December 7, 1959, p. 8#
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lethal force, only hours away from any area in the world would be a

deterrent, limited only by the effectiveness of the foroe and the time

required to move it to a troubled area," 37

In his opinion the Air force

was fitted for this task because of the speed and range, low cost, and
destruotivenees of just one air squadron.

Such a force would permit

leaving deployed forces where they were and still prevent the emergence
of "holes" in the defense system*

Such a foroe would also leave the

massive retaliation potential of SAC undisturbed.
As previously mentioned, this task was given to the 19th Air Force

under General Henry Vicoellio.

This Air Force commands no units except

during 4otual iombat deployment and operations •

It trains and coinnands,

identifies landing fields to be used and areas of possible deployment,

and names the specific TAG units to be used in the operation.
Composite Air Strike

I

l

Thus the

orce provides conventional or nuclear forces which

can be dispatched to any area of the world, to be used alone or as part

of a joint operation, in a limited war or to replace theater forces
sent to other areas of the world thus preventing a gap in the defense

uotture.

38

The foroes used in these operations would come from the 9th

and 12th ^acticul Air Forces and would consist chiefly of F-100 fighter

bombers, iaoe and ^tador surfaoti-to-surface missiles, transport and
support aircraft*

In the area of conflict these forces could conduct

3?

University
General Henry Vicoellio, "Composite Air Strike Foroe", Air
Quarterly Review , vol, IX, Winter 1956-57, p. 28.
38

Ibid # , pp. 34-35.

»
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oountsr air operations, Interdiction, close uir support, tactical rooonalssance,
and airlift.

39

In 1958 Composite :dr Strike Forces were sent to Lebanon and

Formosa, and it was claimed by the Air Force that these forces "helped

Uaaasurably to halt these flare-ups before

.for ld-wide

nuolear exchange

became a possible results"40
At least ajaomz the commanders of 17 C the proposition that the possi-

bility of Halted wars occurring in the future began to take hold.

In

1S69 General Vioeellio* oaamander of the 19th Air Foroe, expressed this
view*

He noted*

"Perhaps

too re

than anything ulse, we in TAC are anxious

to establish the proper emphasis on limited vmr versus general war.
v'.hile

cur equipment and our missions are compatible with either cir-

cumstance, the aooeptanoe of both possibilities we believe will lead to
a full appreciation of our military and political environment.

Al
"

Thie

attitude has also been supported by General Frank Everest, the present
oomounder of TAC, who stated that "only If we fail to maintain modern
taotical weapons systoas will ¥e jeopardise our

ability to meet the

42

11 war threat."

'^-'Composite air Strike i'oroe.
July 19,1953. p. 23.

'

Army, flawy,

ir

I

oroe Journal , vol. XCV,

^General Henry Viooellic, "Composite ~ir Strike Force 1356,"
Air University quarterly Ho view, vol. X, duimaer, 1959, p. 14.

41
Ibid,, p. 17

42

Goneral Frank Lverest,

I960, p. 3.

TAC

today,

"

The

Almen ,

vol, IV, January.
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While this is the attitude of TAG, the rest of the Air Force pay

only lip servioe to the forces of the T^otioal Air Command.

It has

been supported by General LeMay who has fought for the maintenance
of manned bomber and fighter strength. 43

General

Yv'hite

has stated that

the composite strike forces "represent a long stride in the direction
of fast response to limited war situations,
on several occasions

Nevertheless,

.as

and he has supported TAG

far as fund allocation within

the servioe is concerned, TAG has been the stepchild of the Air Force.

43
Army,
44

flavy,

Air Force Journal , vol. XCVI, September 6, 1958, p. 14.

Army, Navy, Air frorce Journal , vol. XCVI, November

45

1,

1958, p. 31.

See General White's comments in the Army, Havy, Air Foroe Journal
vol. XCVI, January 31, 1959, p. 35; The Airman vol. Ill, July, 1959, p. 46:
and the Army, i^avy, Air Force Register , vol. LXjCa, liovember 28, 1959, p. 17.

^
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The Armed Services have developed a melange of programs to deal
with

limited war and have a variety of attitudes toward the priority of develop-

ment of these programs.
(D ## Tex.),

In the words of Representative George iahon

chairman of the defense subcommittee of the House Appropria-

tions Committee

i

It would appear that under present circumstances each
of the three services is seeking to be prepared to do the
entire job
fight the whole war. This, of course, is
not the announced policy of each service... The Army wants
a strategic-type missile so it can attack distant targets
and will not be dependent upon the Air Force even for re-

—

oonaissanoe. The Navy wants a strong air and missile
capacity to take care of its own strategic needs and
concepts. The Air Force may well want to keep its
strategic aircraft mission even after missiles have
replaoed the strategic mission of manned aircraft. The
real battle at present results... from the anxiety which
arises over the question of who will dominate the picture
in the missile atomic age. .However, ... .the time has
come to tear down the costly iron curtain which separates
the services.

There is much truth in this statement, although it would be denied by
the services.

It points to the fact that there is a great political

struggle going on among the services in order to maintain their respective

budgets and positions.
One of these struggles has been over the need for airlift by the

Army to transport its forces quickly to trouble spots in the world.
The Army claims it does not have the facilities to move one division by

air (this does not apply to the airborne divisions).

This opinion has

been voiced by Generals (ret.) Gavin and Taylor and by General Lemnitzer,
the present Cliaiman of the Joint Chiefs of Stuff.

46

Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt.
May 24, 1957, pi 7605.

6,

According to

85th Congress, 1st Session,

39

General (ret.) Thomas Phillips, the Air Force

T

*has

refused to give any

priority to furnishing sufficient air transport to carry one or two

Army or Marine divisions quickly to the scene of conflict.

1

Air Foroe

officials say that "it (the Air Force) cannot sacrifice the need to

build up the Strategic Air Coccmnd and air defenses to provide airlift
t47
for the Array.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liathan Twining

has implied that it is all a matter of priorities,

he stated in 1958

that when the Joint Chiefs were considering what they would like to buy
the most if they were given an additional £1.5 or 52.5 billion, "troop

carrier aircraft were not on any service list.

blamed the services, including the
lift,

Amy* for

In this sense he

not pushing increased air-

furthermore, he has stated that, in faot, the United States

already has sufficient troop airlift, as was shown in the Lebanon incident.
In that case, he stated, the United States had more airlift than was

needed, for the airfields were not in sufficient quantity to take care
of a large airlift.

He has even questioned the value of a large-scale

airlift by stating, "I do not know of any place except on the mainland
of Europe itself where you could really launch a massivs airlift of the

kind that General Gavin was talking about, two or three divisions.
Yet the Army wants more airlift.

from purely strategic motivation.

«49

This desire does not stem, however,

It would allow the Army to gain extra

power without expending any of the Anay's budget, as the funds would come

47 Army, Savy, Air loroe Register , vol. LXXYIII, July 6, 1957,

?.

2.

4 8 Congressional Record , vol. 104, pt. 15, 65th Congress, 2nd Session,
Au gu st 21, 1958, p. 18388.

49

Ibid., p. 19892.

.
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from the Air Force Budget.

Furthermore, there ia the specter of the

aircraft industry behind this struggle. An in o retted airlift *ould bring

bigger contracts to this industry, and thus they advocate more airlift
along with an increase in manned aircraft for the services.

This attitude

has been verified by Robert Gross , ohaixmn of the board of Lockheed

Aircraft Corp. In December of 1957 and by
dent of Lockheed, in early 1968.

SO

I

r. Mall Hibbaro,

a.

vice presl-

While such a program may be beneficial

to the country, there is tha danger that it may actually do more harm

than

This applies to mere airlift as well as to newer missiles

.^ood.

and "exotic

11

According to Representative William Bray (R., Ind.)j

weapons*

it is interesting that there is always u loudly vocal

group which demands that one speeific segment of our military
be expanded to the exclusion of the others to the detriment
It is also interesting that
of the entire military program.
this demand for a specific weapon is usually ma4a after the
'specific weapon they are selling Is outmoded* 01
1

If this is true, then some of the programs which will help build up a

limited war force may have fallen by the wayside for selfish, not
strategic reasons.
Cne of the reasons why such pro crams (such as
an* troso airlift; <«a?o lost out is internal.

am

modernisation

The fany, in a drive to

sot up a fissile program in the raid-lSoC's, olea its budget, thus pre-

venting & modernisation of woapons.*^

However, evoa aftor muoh of the

Army 's mlestle program was taken awuy from it, the

Any

continued to

press for tho a**ilQt**mz& of the anti-missile and air defense as a way

SOsee Sew York Hatet , December 11, 1637 and Ordnance vol. 42 # I*ar*h~
*pril # 1953, pp. 614-lfl.
&X

oon^re8sloaal
SepteSBer 1, 19 oC , p. 17817
&2

H>5, pt. 1?, 66th

Tlm» # vol. LXXVI, October 17, 1900,

p.

26.

*mi+ **i

lst i^ssion,

.
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of staying in the race for missile control, at the expense of a

modernization program.

The Air Force has also tied up funds in programs

in order to save them, when in some oases were scheduled to be dis-

continued or were not yet ready to roll.

Such

*.ms

the case in 1956,

when it stepped up production of the B-62 at a time when the country
was well ahead of the Russians in manned bombers.

The same could be

said of the liquid boron fuel project on which 1 240 million was lavished

before it was discontinued. 55
Navaho, and Rasoal missiles.

The same can be said of the iiatador, Snark,
The Kavy w&s also guilty of such maneuvering.

The ^avy's Seamaster bomber was discontinued after 3400 million

spent on it.

v/as

The Regulus air-breathing missile was obsolete before it

was developed, and it too was discontinued.^

Another reason programs for limited war have been neglectod is
because of the fight for missile control among the three services.

The

Air Force has (as of .I960) three ICBM f s in operation or being developed
and seven other assorted surface-to-surface, air-to-air, surface-to-air,
and air-to-surface missiles operational or in the development stages.

The Army has fourteen assorted missiles in operation or being developed,

and the #avy

lias

twelve including

fr^o

under^ater-to-underwater missiles.

55

The great cost of these missiles naturally takes up a great portion of
the budgets of the services.

Greater coordination of these programs could,

conceivably, free more funds for limited war programs.

^Congressional Record, vol. 105, pt. 14, 86th Congress, 1st Session,
Se ptember 1,

54
56

1959, p. 17^20

Ibid .

of
0rdnanoe , vol. 44, March-April, 1960, inset. This is un increase
seventeen over the missiles produced or bein# developed in 1956.

There is also the problem of waste in the cervices, due to excessive

duplication of facilities and services.
field was just noted.

The duplication in the missile

Others include the existence of marginal and

non-essential installations and activities based on outmoded mobilization
plans geared for World War II, three different types of supply systems,

separate maintenance of communication networks, separate intelligence
services, and separate jet trainers used by the Navy and Air Force. 56

These are just a few of many instances of duplication.

If this dupli-

cation were oorreoted, the Republicans argue, the country could ret a
greater or the same degree of defense for a lesser sum of money.

However,

there are still the obstacles offered by the services themselves in

seeking to maintain their own positions.
Thus, the reasons for the attitudes of the armed services toward

limited war are as varied as the attitudes themselves.

At least all the

services see the need for the development of forces to cope -with limited

war situations.

But there is a great deal of difference between mere

words and actual deeds.

Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt. 12, 66th Congress, 1st Session,
August 10, 1959, p. 153S0.

.
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Chapter III

The Debute on Limited War
The Administration

Early in 1S57 ^resident Eisenhower appointed H. Rowan Neither,
Chairman of the Board of the Ford Foundation, as chairman of a secret
committee to investigate the status of American security*

Although

originally secret, section* of the report were finally published late
in the year.

The report stressed the fact that the United States would

be moving; into a period of military weakness unless spending for military
and civil defsnse were increased.

It is not

<nown whether the recommenda-

tions of the ooauiittee were adopted*

They were not even presented to

the Senate Araed Services Committee.

Gome of the reasons given for this

action were expressed by Senator Stuart Symington who felt that the

administration believed the report to be so "terrifying** in its implications with respect to the current position of the united States, that

even Senators were not allowed to look at it.*

It 3howed too muoh

dissatisfaction with administration policies and placed them in a bad
li&ht.

Release of these recommendations in full would be bad publicity

and might even have put a scare into our allies.

Thus the administration

was able to keep the report under the cloak of secrecy, and refused to
say what effect thess recommendations would have on policy*
Yet, President Eisenhower did use tho report as a background in his

speeoh of *ovaaber 14, 1957, at Oklahoma ^ity.

"..as

There he stated,

a primary deterrent to war, the nation must maintain a strong

Congressional necord vol, 104, pt. 14, 85th Jon-ress, 2nd Session,
August 14, 1958, p. 17b£3
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nuolear retaliatory power and weapons must keep paoe with increasing

technological projects.

The dispersal and readiness of the Strategio

Air Command must be increased so that it will not be destroyed on the
ground by missile attack.,. In cooperation with its /Qlies, the United
States must maintain a flexible force with conventional weapons to put
out brush-fire wars before they can spread into all-out nuclear war." 2

With this speech, the Army began to take heart, believing that the
administration was at last ready to heed its advice and recognize the
need to have ioroes capable of meeting all types of aggression.
it seemed as if this were going to occur,

Indeed,

for in May of 1953, the admin-

istration announced the formation of the Strategio Army Corps to deal with
limited war situations anywhere in the world.
150,000 infantrymen and paratroopers

—

It was to be made up of

two infantry and two airborne

divisions maintained in the United States to meet or reinforce any
initial requirements throughout the world.

Its effectiveness and speed

were dependent upon adequate air and sea lift to be supplied by the Air
1

i

oroe and Navy.'

organization.

Although it seemed impressive, STRuC was a paper

It contained many green troops and had a high turnover,

and not enough air lift was being supplied by the Air Force to transport
one division overseas.*

However, it was a beginning.

There are two possible explanations for the creation of STRAC.

It

could have been merely a "sop" thrown to the critics of the administration
to quiet them for the time being) or it could have been part of a genuine

^President Eisenhower, quoted in Mew York Times , December 21, 1957,
3New ^ork Times
,

4

May 21, 1958,

p.

10.

Hanson Baldwin, Kew York Times, May 24, 1958, p. 12.

V

p.

8.

effort by the administration to oeaac relying upon tho doctrine of

massive retaliation to solve all of ita defense problems, to begin to
see the possibility of limited wars occurring in tho future, and to

implement policy to provide the forces to meet this throat.

If this

seoond reason is taken as valid, certain policy decisions and statements
by the administration seem to bear it out.

first there was a study

ordered by the National Security Council in May of 1958 to examine in

detail a score of areas in the world to determine the sise and composition
of forces required to meet local egrrssslon.

Taking part in the

were both State Department and Pentagon officials.

study-

Its purpose was to

draw up a picture of the world situation in order to determine a basis
for a Halted war policy to be followed by the administration. 5

was coupled with an announcement by tho Soorotary of Defense

This

2j'eil

•'•or.lroy

at a news conference that month that he planned to publicise American

capabilities of masting limited war situations.

Ri indicated that

information on such a capability had been neglected because of the
hi.

h priority placed on strategic weapons, but that the administration

was not negleoting it and that this capability was, in fact, adequate to
meet any emerge noy.

However, he did indicate that only by retaining an

ability to retaliate with great destructive power available through the
Stratcgie Air Command would general

mr

be less lively than limited war.

These atatementa thus supported the Air Jroroa point of view with regard
7
to priorities of weapone systems and indioated that, although the

*Hn

York limes , fey 25, 1953, p. 28,

6 I4eil iio&lroy,

quoted In law York Times , Hay 50, 1958,

7

p.

1.

A weapons system is defined as those "facilities and equipment, in
used
combination or otherwise, whioh form an instrument of combat to be
Navy, Air *droe
by one or more of the military departmental Army,
Journal, vol, IffUg Juno 27, 1959, pp. 1, 53.
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administration was thinking about the possibilities of limited wars,
the

main concern was developing a huge nuolcar retaliatory force at the
expense
of conventional forces.

Nevertheless, by June of 1952 it seemed as if the Army position

sight be gaining.

Due to Aray prodding and the rush of '"small

sinae 1345 (see page 25a

)

f

ws"

it seemed that the administration had begun

to take notice of the possibility of developing a separate limited war

•apability.

Two major studios on limited war had bean started, a third

study on troop carrier airlift was also started, and an Army force
(STRAC) had been created to deal with any siaall-soale emergency that

might occur.
Secretary ^o&lroy even indicated at a press conference that in the

future the Defense Department would make a "greater effort" to stress
the country's capacity to cope wit:, United wars.

This hope was short-lived, however.
aj. other

press conference Secretary

facing the Defense Department

—

c -Iroy

8

Late that same month at

outlined the chief problems

military spending, choosing

araon.

weapons eyste~is, judging the forces required for so-called limited war,
continental defenses, ^Jd strategic forces for nuclear retaliation.

If

stressed that there was unanimity in governmental departments that the

fundamental deterrent to a war with the Soviet -nion was the country's

nuclear retaliatory for«s, and that existing Army and Marine troops
equipped with superior weapons were adequate to cope with limited war
situations.

Shat came ac a bitter blow to the Army

ms

the statement

that the nation's future military security lay in priorities for big

New York Times, June

2,

1356, p. 14.
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weapons j he even stressed the use of 3-47*3 equipped with conventional
weapons as useful for limited warfare. 9
The Army position was further downgraded by i-onald stuarles. Deputy
Secretary of Defanse, in a speech at the Marine Corps School in July
of 1953.

There he put forth a plan to deal with limited wars merely

by strengthening the forces of our allies to deter the

starting liraited wars,* 0

from

This would then free American efforts to

build up retaliatory' forces.
f laxibilit--' to

^ ojjj.hu niBts

At the saae time he stated,

*>7e

must have

meet any situation, but our overriciag ob 1ectivos must
t

be readiness for this worso eventuality (all-out war), in case our
efforts to hold it to small war proportions fail."

11

Thus, throughout the period 1057-19S8 the administration's attitude

toward limited war was not vory clear.

At times Secretary

-c.Jlroy

indicated that more effort would bo made to improve the country's ability
to oope with limited wars.

It did not seem that these indications vrere

sincere, or would be adhered to, for it was evident that the Defense

Department as well as the President viewed the troops in-being as sufficient
to cope with limited war, and that top priority Tsould still be given the

large nuclear weapons,
and studies ^re cheap an
the adainlstration.

fthat is evident here is that
•

words, reports,

can be used to quiet oritios who may embarrass

One of these critics was Senator Stuart Symington.

In -August of 1SS8 he indicated the uselessness of the policy of the

administration of calling in special oonr.ittees and starting special

Neil ^o-'lroy, press conference, Sew
1Q

^n:

aew York limes , July 7, 1968, p. 13.

U Ibid.

limes , June 20, 1956, p. 11.

•

studies *hich would indicate that aotion had been taken by the
administra-

tion to meet now threats to Aaerioan security.

BU

spoeoh ran as follows:

*

tim

and again in recent years the administration has
gotten together an Independent group of patriotic citizens
to make various reports about the status of our national
defense* *.

When the -ockefoller report
issued, what did it say?
It said, in effect, *Y?e are not doing nearly enough to
defend the United States** What has the result been since
that report or rather sinoe sputniok? We have added 1 # 3
peroent to what we wore already spending to defend ourselves,
which is a great deal loss than the administration figures
with respect to the devaluation of the dollar over the
same period,
Xhen we had the Oaither re port*. The report was never
released, even to the Senate Armed Services Coxaaittee*
it wus refused the Senate Armed Services Ccsa&ittee and
the rumor spread that the report was so terrifying in
its implications with respect to the current position
of the ^ited States in the world of today that evfcn
Senators were not allowed to look at it* Actually, it
has never yet been given to the Armed Services ^OHuaittee*
come now even to another report, one discovered by
the counsel of the Johnson Preparedness Subcommittee, who
read about it in the h&lt'Maore ^un,
(This refers to the
Johns *iopkin« study headed by Tr. Illis Johnson*)
fee

It said in effect, f This is your (the administration) fault*
You people in the administration continue to get groups of

outstanding oitiseas together to make reports. Without
exception, they all say that what wo are doing is totally
inadequate* •Tliey all say we could spend billions of dollars
aore a year on defense without adversley affecting the
eeonoray ***In other words, ever; tiaie you set up a conualttes,
that eorxnittee suys we are not doing enough* Yet we do very
12
little more.
f

Although this was a highly partisan speech, it did shew that the
administration ^as not fooling everyone*
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It eould also be said that the statements of
Secretary tfoElroy were

aloo being used merely as a means of temporarily quieting the
oritios
of the administration, while the debate ocnoorning the new
budget was
in progress.

Vrertheloes, it must be admitted that at least the

administration finally admitted publicly that a study of the country's

United war capability was needed, and that,

if the r.ots warranted it,

such a capability would reooive further attention.

It was apparently

not of immediate concern, however.
Thus, in his State of the Union messa e in January of

If*

58,

^resident Eisenhower stressed the "formidable air striking forces

the united States and the great flexibility of this force,

"

of

H© oven

painted a rosy pioture of swift-moving, powerful "ground and tactical*

forces moving with "swiftness and precision" to "help cut off threatened

aggression,

*5

The tone of the speooh was unmista'ceably favorable to

tho strengthening of the nuclear retaliatory forces, and any mention
of the capability to fight limited wars was vague and lightly passed

over*

This trend was followed in testimony by General T .fining and

Secretary ^oklroy before the Senate Foreign Relations ^oantibtea and Armed
Services "Jom-iitteo,

Before the foreign Relations Ooruaittee Secretary

MoElroy indicated that the united States' military power was still adequate
to deter the Russians from starting a general war, and that for looul

warfare tho United States had enough conventional firepower to contain
14

the hostilities and prevent them frcm spreading,*

Likewise, a glowing

report was given to the Armed Services Committee,

There Mo&lroy voiced

^President Eisenhower, State

of the Union iiessage, quoted in sow York

limes , January 10, 1959, p. 6.
14

Hew York Times, January 17, 1S69. p. Is

the old Charles

Him

lino that the United States 1 ability to deal with

liaitod war situations was derived from its forces

war.

15

i'or

waging general

However, it is dlffioult to see how the Jcint Chiefs and the

Secretary of Defease oould bo anything but optimistic concerning defense
policies; essentially the policies were thoir own and thus had to be

defended.
to the administration at thut

posture ssemed good,

tisie

the overall United States military

la all fields of weaponry the United States seemed

to be ahead or equal with the Russians.

Russia had 150 heavy bombers

compared to the United States' 500-600) 1000 medium bombers to the

U.S.'s 1600 1 hundreds of 700-800 mile missiles compared to 4 U.S. Xhor
(1500 mi,) squadrons in Great Britain) the two were eve a

ir.

*

S)

Russia had no fleet carriers to the G.S.'s 14) 450 submarines (none
missile-firing or nuclear) to the r.S.»s 53 nuclear submarines and -50
ocnventional submarines) 175 divisions to the R***H 17.

16

This added

up to a nuclear superiority for the United States, but indicated a lack
in limited war forces, as nuelear weapons oould not ^e viewed as subfurthermore, these published

stitutes for a limited war capability,

figures on Russian strength were at best
ourrent intelligence.

uesstimatee" and way behind

Thus, while the administration had confidence in

its policies, it was hard to tell where the United States stood in

relation to the Soviet Union and just how effective our forces were.

According to the Army and &avy, we were behind.

Hew *ork Times, January 21, 1559,

p. 11

Hanson Baldwin, few York Times, April 5, 1953, IV,

p. 3.

"
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Although the United States seemingly had this "nuclear superiority,
it was evident that the Defense Department was facing serious problems.

Tha Army and Navy ware ranped against the Air

strength of the deterrent for general war, the

i*'orae

with regard to the

Amy

and the Wavy still

maintaining that an overkill capacity existed and that more funds should
be allocated for limited war forces j while the Air Foroe maintained that

we

raust

us/

1

have sufficient forces to "destroy the enemy's ability to destroy

There was also the Army view that more manpower and funds were

neadad to develop a capability for waging limited war6, with or without
nuclear waapons.

These were the major problems of importance to this
1

7

paper, although there were others.*'

Up to his retirement on December

2,

1959, and in spite of those

problems. Secretary iioElroy reiterated his belief that the United States
had a sufficient capability to deal with limited war as well as general
war, even though the Army and **avy were saying that this was not so.

«ith the appointment of Thomas Gates as Secretary of Defense in December
of 1959, a new variable entered the picture, for Mr. Gates as Secretary
of the Navy had been a strong supporter of outbacks in expenditures for

increased nucleur deterrent in order to develop limifcad war forces.

What his attitude as Secretary of Defense

is

going to be will be interesting

to note.

Thus from 1957 to 1959 the administration, although at tines forceful
in maintaining the superiority of the American military structure, 6eemed

hesitant about stating what its position in regard to limited war actually

For other problems facing the rentagon ano Defense Department, see
the New York Times, May 4 # 1969, p. 25 and riay 5, 1959, p. 20.
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was.

At no time oid it define its policies toward limited
war.

Time

and again the Secretary of Defease, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs,

and tne President indicated that the country possessed adequate
forces
to meet all situations, while at the same time, they ordered studies
to

determine whether these capabilities were in faot adequate.

Then, when

these studies and reports indicated that more had to be done, the Adminis-

tration refused to aot.

Although the Army, the

liavy, and

other administra-

tion personnel reiterated the need for a change in emphasis in defense
policy, the administration regained committed to the oonoept of massive

retaliation as a panacea for all military problems.

There was no change

in priorities during this period, and the attitude remained the same as
it was in 1954.
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Chapter IV
The Debate on Limited
Congress

v^ar

The debate over the country's defense posture has increased in

sharpeess in the halls of Congress from 1957 to 1959* During this period
it has also become more partisan in character.

war has taken an important role.

In the debate limited

The debate is essentially over whether

the country is spending enough to insure adequate defense*

The Democrats

have argued that we are extending our commitments without providing

adequate forces to meet them and that we are relying too heavily on

massive retaliation to solve all our military problems.

The Democrats

have also felt that the administration has made too much of an effort to

economize at the expense national security.

The Republican minority,

on the other hand, has continually backed administration policy and has

felt that the backbone of a strong defense is a strong economy .

They

have refused to agree to increasing the defense budget to the sums asked

for by the Democrats but have reluctantly had to go along with the majority.

On the whole, especially in the Senate, they have tended to view forces

required for massive retaliation as sufficient to deter the Communists
from starting any local wars.

This chapter will try to cover the course

of this debate, with particular emphasis on limited war, from 1957 to 1959.

The first session of the 85th Congress during 1957 was marked by a

particular lack of conflict over the defense issue, especially with
regard to limited war forces.

?he Democrats tended to show partisanship

as
in their speeches on national defense, but they were not as sharp

those in 1958, or 1959.

The main reason for this lack of sharpness and

54

interest in the debate was that there was not a clear enough
Democratic

majority in the Senate (43 Democrats and 47 Republicans) to permit
the
Senate to aot with bold authority to counter administration policy,

^either party could rally their forces in the liouse.

'ru"theraore,

there were no pressing international incidents (such as Lebanon

and rormosa in 1958) to bring about sharp oonf lists in Congress.

Also,

the first sputnik was launohed too late in the year to have any effect
on this session,

i-inally, it seemed as if the drastic need for more

limited war forces had not taken hold in either party in 1957.
In the House in 1357 both Democrats and Republicans voiced the same

opinion with regard to national defense and limited war,

Xhey both

voiced the need for economy and forces adequate to meet all military
threats. The democratic position was clarified by Rep. ;£obert Sikcs
(D.,

i'

la.) urho said that "if limited wars are to be the pattern or if

Russia suddenly moves to occupy all of Europe, we must have trained and
equipped troops on the ground and ready,

Several Republicans epoke for

their side and all agreed that a sound economy #as necessary if the country
was to oontinue to enjoy prosperity.
*"artin (R #l
is

lMM»)«

But in the words of Rep. Joseph

'the poorest place in the world to begin that eoonoay

2
risking our national security."

Likewise, Rep* Leslie Areads

(R., 111.) stated that 'we are not willing %o commit tha sin of risking

the safety of our country in the name of economy.

In a 3peech in

June of 1957 Rep. James V^n iandt (R., ^a.) else voiced the need for the

Congressional record.
p. 7723.

aay £7, 1957,
2

Ibid.,
S

k

Vol. 10S,

;
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maintenance of | sound massive retaliatory capacity as well as a
"capaoity to fight snail or limited wars with the use of either tactical

atonic weapons or of conventional arms, as the oircumstanoes may require, "*
During this session in the House these statements were scattered and for
the most part, brief.

There were no major speeches on defense in the

House during 1957, and the speeches that were made usually agreed with
eaoh other.

The same tended to be true in the Senate in 1357.

There was no

apparent debate over the country's defense posture, and what disagree-

ment that did show up occurred within the ranks of the Demooratic party.
To Senator Dennis Chaves (D», H.iJ.), the chairman of the defease sub-

committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the possibility that

the United States might have to face limited wars in the future was
f-reat,

but the existing deterrent forces were adequate to prevent these

wars from oreaking out into general war.**

The chief opposition to this

attitude oame from Senator Paul Douglas (D., 111.) in a major speech on

defense polioy.

He statod that we had increased our commitments but

had reduced the "military strength which we need to help check probing
it

operations and liaited wars started by the Communist

bloc" 0

He cited

the existence of the nuclear stalemate, and said that what was needed to

prevent the outbreak of liaited wars under the umbrella of this stalemate

was "a sufficient force in readiness, v/ell-equipped and trained, which
can be rushei to cruolal points which the Communists are either attaokiag

4 Ibid

.,

5 lb Id.

,

6 Ibid.,

pt. 5, July 1, 1957, ?. 10264.
p. 106 19.
p.

10654.

5G

or threatening to attaok.*' 7

Tot, he felt that this was the portion of

our araed services that was being slighted by the etnphasis being
placed
on the "major- deterrents."

The same sentient was echoed by Senators

Stuart Symington (^.,

Joseph 0»Hahoney U.,

Jlont.), and Henry Jaokson (l>.,

ash.).

.\y 0 .

,

'ike

*%nsfield

8

Conspicuously, during this whole session there vrere no speeches by

the Republicans on this matter, nor
overly strong.

-/ere the

efforts of the Democrats

On the whole, in both the house and the Senate, 1957

a relatively quiet year in tho urea of national defense and limited

i'/us

war.

Ihus, there were no real, stronr attitudes on either side, nor

were there any clear cut issues to divide the two sides on partisan ground.
In contrast to 1957, the second session of the 86th

1953 w^s the dlroot opposite.

degress in

The dobate over defense, and especially

United war, became more heated and tho parties began to take opposite
sides, the Republicans defending existing force levels and the use of

nassivo retaliation and the Democrats favoring more spending and loss

reliance on massive retaliation to meet all military emergencies.

One

of the chief reasons for this upsurge in tho debate was the fact that

1953 was an election year, causing both parties to clarify their positions
and attack eaoh other.

The Republicans naturally hagan to defend the

administration's policy, while the /emocrats tended to attach them.

In

the non-partisan area, the tightening of tensions in Lebanon and tho

Formosa straits caused don. ress to take more notice of the possibilities
of limited wars, and thus Congressional opinion, aspeoially in the Senate,

7

Ibid.
8 Ibid.,

pp. 1066B-71.

i
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began to favor the build-up of forces necessary to fight limited wars and
to improve the defense establishment of the United States in general.
In Xuy of 1958 the Senate Preparedness .subcommittee Issued a seventeen

p int program for decisive action in the area of defense,

This program

was arrived at on a non-partisan basis and was signed by both ^enocratio
and Republican members of the oommitteo.

covered all areas of defense.
tion and strengthening of SaCj

These points were detailed and

The program is as follows

c;

stem;

ground and naval forces;

5)

4)

improvement of

6) adequate airlift for ground foroesj

Atlas, Thor, and Jupiter missiles

systems;

the modernisa'

modernisation and strengthening of the

7) a {.-rsater anti-iubraarine warfare program;

Titanj

1)

2) step up in the dispersal of SAC bases

3) more effort in developing anti-missile missiles;

the early warning

i

<tni

9) greater production of

accelerated development of the

reduction in the lead time in tho development of weapons
10) freer exchange of scientific and technological information

among nations of the Free Y»orld;
a million pound thrust;

11) development of a rocket motor with

12) more shelters and greater stockpiles for

civil defense ;

IS) reorganisation of the structure of the defense

establishment j

14)

increased incentives for tho retention of trained

personnel in the armed services;

development programs;

15) acceleration of all research and-

16) more devs I orient of manned missiles; a:;d

17) acceleration of the Polaris missile system.

9

Of particular importance

the Army,
for limited war were the provisions for modernising

Marines,

I

an.:

providing for more airlift.

*>avy #

and

As will be shown later, all

Congress, 2nd Session,
-on rresalonal Record, Vol. 104, pt. 6, 85th
May Mi 1»W. PP- S790-97.

,
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those

ftltm

mm

incorporated in the dofonse appropriations bill for

the fiscal year 1969 by Congress.

Thus, this program became the program

of the Senate toward national defense, since the defense
bill was

supported by every Senator who voted.
The concept of limited war also received a boost by the
Senate

Armed Services Committee.

In its report cf July 30, 1958, the Committee

indicated thut the country needed a greater liiaited war capability in

view of the existence of the nuclear staleuate:
The committee feels most strongly that the Department
of Defense should maintain a greater vigilance in establishing
"limited war* capabilities*
It seems obvious that if the
world's two greatest powers reach a nuclear stalemate wherein
differences between them cannot be resolved axoept by resort
to total war, then the situation may well indeed be similar
to thut described by the phrase, n of two scorpions in a
bottle," i.e., mutual annihilation. If one assumes that
nuclear stmlaruu/te c:-.n be roaohed, one must also assume that
the Soviet Union would then be free to a ain exercise the
advantage of its groat superiority in numbers and interior
lines of oonimunication and that it could proceed to disrupt
the world by piecemeal tactics, subversion, and other
pressures backed by the presence of its conventional forces...
In light of this the committee cannot holp but wonder
why the Army has placed such a reut emphasis on fixed
defense (point) weapons systeros which the Committee believes
has Ouused a dimunition of the Army's ground combat capability
(its principal and most important mission). The Committee
believes the Army should take stock of itself and shall redirect its efforts toward providing tho U.S. with the finest
forces in the world capable of victorious sustained ground
combat...

must place greater emphasis on our striking power
and limited war capabilities.
>e must take decisions to
defensive weapons systems, and
eliminate duplication
the defensive weapons system whio we retain should not be
designed in the futile attempt to obtain 100 percent defense 10
but rather in insure the security of our striking capability.
tfe

U

.

Congres si onal Record vol. 104, pt. 12, 85th Congress, 2nd
Session, July 30, ISo;-., pp. 15543-60.
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This report is interesting in that it ohastiees the ^rmy for not
devoting

enough of its own funds to modernisation rather than to continental
air defense, thus pointing up the faot that much of the Anay»» problem
may be internal.

Furthermore, this was the second report by a Congressional

Committee on the inadequacy of the nation's defense forces.

And like

the former report, the 1S58 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee report,

this one was also signed by both Republicans and democrats.

Although these non-partisan reports indicated that not all of Congress
was satisfied with the country's defense forces and that the Lebanon
and Formosa affairs were having their effect with regard to limited war

forces, the debates following these reports became highly partisan and

were influenced largely by the coming off-season election.

Senator

John Kennedy (D,, Mass.) opened the debate on national defense with a

aajor speech on August 14,

11-68*

This speech showed die re most of the

Democrats in the Senate stood with regard to defense.

If first outlined

the world situation facing the U.S. and the Soviet '-nion and then des-

cribed the threat posed by the Communists,

lie

stated!

•••One of the key premises upon which our leaders of
diplomacy, defense, and public opinion have eased their
policy t:-! inking, ••has been, since Hiroshima, our nuclear
power. We have possessed a capaoity for retaliation so
£:r«at as to deter any potential aggressor from launching
a direct attack upon us. Spokesmen for both parties, in the
S«nate and elsewhere, have debated our preparedness upon
1
the assumption that this "ultimate deterrent would deter
any Soviet attaelu». Posses si on of siailar striking power by
it is
the Soviet ^nion has not altered this basio promise
instead described now as the result of a "nuclear stalemate*"
a point of "mutual saturation j" or a Glance cf terror,"

—

In the years of the missile gap, the Soviets may be
expected to use their superior striking ability to achieve
their objectives in ways which may not require launching
an actual attack* Their missile power will be the shield
from behind whloh they will slowly, but surely, advance,—

.

.

through sputnik diplomacy, limited brushf lro wars, indirect
noncvort agression, Intimidation and subversion, internal
revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the
vioious blackmail of our allias. Tha periphery of the Vrea
World will slowly be nibbled away, • .Each such Soviet move
will weaken the mestj but none will seem sufficiently
significant by itself to justify our initiating a nuclear
war which night destroy us. ••This may well be the most
important throat to the United States
In order to counter this threat. Senator Kennedy indicated that more

air tankers, air-to-ground missiles, atomic submarines, solid fuels,
Polaris and Minutoman ICBM's were needed.

He also attacked the

airlift oapaoity of the services by stating that "it should be obvious
from our Lebanon experience that we lack the sea and air lift neoessary
to intervene in a limited war with th« speed, discrimination, and ver-

satility whioh may well be needed to keep it limited

weakening our ultimate retaliatory power,"

12

—

and without

The speeoh was hailed

by Democratic Senators Symington, Jackson, ilanafield and Hill, but
opened the way for partisan attacks by the Republicans in an outburst

that had bean completely absent in 1957.

The rebuttal was started by

Senator Homer Cape-hart (*., Ind.) who brought up the issue of partisanship and sot tha tone for further rebuttal by the Republicans.

In

effect, ha said that *.. .there is a oonoerted effort on the part, not
of all Senators, but of a few Senators on the opposite side of the

aisle to discredit, 100 peroent, tha President. of the United States i
to sell our Defense Establishment short j

arid

to make statements whioh,

conin ay opinion, oould give comfort to the enemy because they are
13
stantly repeated."

lie

went on to blame the Democrats for any short-

Cs^ressioxwl Record , vol. 104, pt. 14, 35th Congress, 2nd Session,
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August 14, 1958, pp. 17 bo 9-7 1
1 2 Ibid.
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comings in national defense, and this thame,
as well as hie P lsa to

•top "•oiling our defense* short." was taken up
by other Republicans.
Senator Leverett Salton.tall
ft** Mass.) voiced this sentiment by
saying*
•••Let us not sell ourselves short. The Soviets
may be
ahead of us in some developments. But when soma persons
base their conolusions on estimates of Russian
efforts,
as compared with our efforts, when actually the
Russians'
are merely estimates anu are not hard, certain evidence,
then I am worried. There is a great coal of difference
between making a Judgment based on estimates of what wo
think the Soviets are doin& and making a judgment based
on what we know they are doing...

must strike the proper balance between the weapons
of the future and the weapons we need today. We cannot
hope to oonoentrate on eaoh year's military weaponry to
the same extent that the Russians, if they choose to
attack us, can concentrate on the weaponry of the one
particular time they nay select for attack.
fie

The thesis behind the Saltonstall speeoh was that existing forces should
be built up before going on *o more advanced weapons.

In this respect

he was also following the views of the Senate Armed Services Committee

and several i^emoorats.

His dosire was to strike a balanoe between

present and future weapons, but where he and the Democrats differed

was over the fact that he felt that this balanoe had already been
achieved, whereas the democrats cid not think so.

Senator Kennedy's attack on the country's airlift capacity for
limited wars was oountered by General Twining (see page3cf

)

and

by Senator ^resoott Bush (k.. Conn.) who felt that air lift in Lebanon
was not a problem and that we actually had an abundance of air and sea
lift for troops. **

Senator Frank Barrett (R.,

iVyo.)

launched a speeoh

^Congressional
.core, vol. 104, pt. 15, 85th Congress, 2nd Session,
August ?1, 1358, pp. 18887, 18889.
>

Ibid., pp. 16891-9 2.

"

praising administration polioies, acting Its "magnif ioent accomplishments,
end expressing tho opinion that we should place cur chief reliance for

defense upon manned aircraft, ballistio missiles, SAC airborne alerts,

anti-mlsalle alssllea, the Polaris, and early

-earning: sy stems

j

but

lie

made no mention of the Halted war threat or the need for forces to
raeet this

threat. 18

Many of the same opinions cere ex prosed in the house, although they

were not ae heated.

There were even disagreements between members of

the Re publican party, while the Democrats held virtually the

opinions as their colleagues in tho Senate.

saiae

One of the few Republicans

to recognise the need for adequate limited war forces was Rep. Francis

Dora (R., N.Y»).

He emphasised the need for these forces as well as

deterrent foroes oapable of dealing a "certain deathblow" to any aggressor
felt that limited war was becoming more likely and forces were needed
Lo

counter this throat,

iie

did not specify economising on the budget,

nor did he attack the Democrats, the main administration critios.

17

Nevertheless, Sepa. William Bray (R., inc.) Timothy i>heehan (R., 111.)

followed the line set forth by Senators Saltonatall and Capehart.
attacked the need for the apendlng of more funds and oountered
Kennedy's speech,

They

enator

*r« Bray defended the administration by saying:

The Army is being reorganised into a ^ntomic structure
that allows small but heavily armed, highly mobile forces
to operate over a great territory without support from
other units.

16

Ibid ., pp. 18397-98

Seasion,
^onrressionai Reoord, vol. 104, f*. 4, 85th Congress, 2nd
:^rch 19, 1958, p. 4017.
17

63

We do have today the oapaoity to launoh a nuclear war
If that necessity ever confronts us. We have the capabilities
of protecting American interests in a limited conventional
war... 18
The administration wus also defended by Mr. Sheohan who blamed any

failures in defense on the Truman administration, thus conducting a
purely partisan attack upon the Democrats. 19
Thus, in Congress 1968 was

with regard to defense policy.

a.

year of charge and counter-charge

There were several different opinions

expressed, as this melange of statements and speeches

Viae

shown j yet a

general attitude favoring an inorease in limited war forces as well as

other elements of defense was beginning to grow.
"Let us not sell

African short," and

The Republican cry was

as this was an election year, the

party vociferously defended administration policy (especially in Lebanon
and

:uomoy) and warned the Democrats to use caution in their attacks.

On the other hanu, the Democrats used the defense issue as a tool in

their campaign to increase their majorities on both Houses.

However,

the reports of the Senate r'reparedness Subcommittee ami the Armed Services

Committee showed that Congress was beginning to take an increased interest
in defense, and the need for a larger defease force wus starting to

take hold due to the events in Lebanon and Formosa.
The 86th Congress was essentially a Democrat ic Congress, as the

Democrats inoreased their majority in each House (S4 to 34 in the Senate
and 280 to 152 in the House).

The Democrats began to increase their

efforts to appropriate more funds for defense.

Looking ahead to the

Presidential eleotion in 1960 the Democrats increased their attacks

upon the Eisenhower administration, and in the struggle they finally
18

19

Ibid

„
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adopted (at least in the Senate) an attitude very favorable to
the

build-up of more adequate forces to fight limited war and thus
generally agreed with the attitude of the Army and Navy toward this
need*

Passive retaliation became one of the prine targets of Demo-

cratic attacks on administration policy

Senator ftubert Humphrey (D* # Minn,) opened the democratic attack
in February of 1959 with

thai

following statements!

By now we should understand the folljj of narrow,
doctrinaire thinking and planning in the field of national
seourity. The idea that Communism could be oontained by the
threat of rnaseive retaliation" bso^uae an absurdity almost
as soon as it was advanced*
Yet how much of our present
military budget is still a hangover from those days?
T,

Until the day when the first sputnik went up, we persisted in happy ignorance, in believing that w© held an
unshakeable deterrent in the foria of our strategic
i^ir arm*

are persisting yet in believing that because we
possess a large family of taotioal nuclear weapons,
we have an effective deterrent against the employment
of Communist ground forces. The "&ore sang for a Buck"
slogan, ••still distorts and tv/ists the thinking of those
who hold the military pursestrings in the administration.
Yes, net even the ^banon and foracsa straits crises have
produced any concrete demonstration that the top levels
of the administration realize that the convsntional
forces are fast rebounding to the center stage.
Vtfe

•••Among the two great gaps. ••in our national armor
is the failure to maintain even a fraction of the modernized,
mobile, but conventional forces needed to detar Communistic
conventional probing and attacks.

These statements Bet the theme of the Democratic attack on the admin-

iBtration for holding back limited war forcos.

This attitude was

repeated by Democratic Senators Lyndon Johnson, Russell Long, Paul
Douglas and Riohard Russell, who attacked the administration action

Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt.
February 17, 1959, p. 2507

2,

86th Congress, 1st Session,

of impounding funds voted by Congress for defense.

response to the6e critioismv

Republicans in

did not defend administration policy

but warned the Democrats to use restraint when dealing with the subject

of military strategy, for such statements would seem to make them

military experts when, in fact, they were not.

22

Nevertheless, the Democratic onslaught continued.

Senator John

Stennis (D. t Miss.) deplored the administration action of cutting SIRAC

by one division, 28 and Senator Mike Monroney (D.,

Olcla.

)

said he was

...alarmed at the growing evidence of the administration^
negleot of our conventional ground forces.. I submit that not
only do wo lack adequate foroes to meet local emergencies,
but we are not developing the airlift capability required
to insure that we o±n rapidly and efficiently apply conventional forces at points of danger. #A flagrant example
of the failure to appreciate the importance of our military
airlift potential is the postponement of the tactical airlift exercises
due to Iftok of operational and maintenace
*
funds in the MATS budget.

—

These attacks were a concentrated effort by the Democrats who thought
that the administration had to wake up and heed the advice of Congress

which constitutionally had been given the right to raise armies and
support them.

Although the Republicans generally supported the Eisenhower policies,
they did agree with the Democrats that the defense establishment had to
This, they agreed, would cost more money,

be expanded.

dut they felt

that the funds could come from economizing in other programs such as

cutting out waste in foreign aid, eliminating the creation of more

gevernmeAt agencies, programs and functions not concerned with survival,

2 1 Ibld

22

»,

pt. o, ^arch 9, 1959, pp. 3502-06,

T

Ibid .
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economising in government activities, postponing all but urgently

noeded roverament programs, stopping the waste of funds by the services
th«a»elves, enforcing present tax rates, and increasing ^coac
In this respect both Democrats and Republicans agreed.

rrowth.

Senator Paul

Douglas even cited examples of waste in procurement by the armed services.
H© cited a survey by the House Committee on Government Operations which

Showed that of the

H4

billion of property owned by the armed services,

$14,5 billion was for operating purposes and $12,1 billion to mobilize
the reserve in case of

-.far.

This left v!7 billion as surplus

rhich the

armed services could put to better use in missiles or modernization, 25
Furthermore, as the next chapter will show, Congress has appropriated

more funds than the administration for the

arm-ad

services in an effort

to build up the country's defense fores s in all area.

In the House, the preparedness debate followed auoh the sane pattern

as it did in the senate,

The Democrats argued for more spending and

criticized administration policy* the Republicans culled for balancing

the budget and defended the administration's policies.

However, on the

subject of limited war and the forces to combat them, there were sharp

disagreements in both parties with Ijmocrats and Republicans
the same side,

taking

as was the case in the Senate, partisanship 3nter«d the

debates in the House,

DanUl Flood

ofter.

Ih© sharpest exchange occurred between Reps.

(D. # Pa.) and Frank 3eoker

M.Y.).

In Rep. Flood's words;

In the face of tho increasing Soviet threat, the
administration suffers from a case cf aggravated complaoenoy.
the
l'he administration is meeting the mounting critioality of
situation with a bland diet of daydreaming and ?fishful thinking and unwillingness to come to grips with the everpresent problem that refuses to fade away,. ..It is a gross disservice to our

Gongressicnal Rooord, vol. 105, pt. 5, 86th Congress, 1st Session.
April c2, 1553, p. 6455.
2S

nation.. .that this offensive of Soviet threats and grim pronouncements of America's forthcoming doom finds its primary
rosponse by tho Eisenhower administration in a rising chant
of what I tern phony economy.
He thus felt that the administration was not making the necessary

preparations for the conduct of limited ?mr.

Hep. Becker countered this

by claiming that the Lemocrats were too concerned with military preparations for defense and were ignoring the need for defense against the

total Communist throat (military, political, economic, and social).

He

then blamed the Democrats for tho failure of the B-36 program, the delays
in tho H-bomb and missile programs, and outbacks in military personnel

in all the services.

Tho most partisan statement of the session came

from Rep. Stephen Berounian (&., N.Y.) who said that the Truman administration

r

spent more for peanuts between 1947 and 1952 than it did on

intermediate and long-range missiles." 25

Although these remarks were

highly partisan they did not reflect the attitude of the whole House,
and often Republicans and Democrats joined sides.
The sharpest division of opinion over defense policy came of the

discussion of limited war and the forces needed to cope with these wars.
Democrats such as Clarence Cannon and George Mahcn were against the

buildup of limited war forces.

&r. Cannon attacked the build-up of

manpower in ths Array and the construction of more carriers for the Navy.
In his opinion tho majority of funds should

submarines*

26

?1
'

o

for more missiles and

Rep. Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee,

Ibid ., pt. 2, February 18, 1959, p. 2590.
Ibid ., pt. 4, March 18, 1959, pp. 4523-28

Ibid ., p. 4526.
?9

,

Ibid., ilareh 14, 1953, pp. 6066-67.
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issued the following report and warning*

We need to continue, ae we have in recent years , to
faoe up to the etark reality that the issue involved is
the survival of the United States.
Preparation for
limited war is neoe*«ary. . .and such effort is proceeding,
ihere are sane weaknesses. We do not have enough mobility.
V| provided some mobility funds above the budget last year
to cope with the same small war threat.
Yesj preparation
for limited war is proceedings But to emphasise preparation
for limited war as top priority consideration is to invite
disaster, is to invite general war.
Adequate preparation for total war is the best possible
deterrent to limited war. This is true because of the
great danger that any limited war of consequence may very
probably expand into general war.
Is it not true that if we are able to cope

with all
the aspeots of general war the chances are we will be
able to meet the limited war threat?. • ..V/e have an Army of
870,000 men trained in versatile types of military procedure.
He have a Navy j we have the Marine** We have amphibious
landing capability. We have 25 active carriurs. We have
'the Tactical Air Force* Wo have troop carrier aircraft. We
have a variety of weapons designed to be useful in general
war and in limited war*
Let us makfc sure we are reasonably well prepared for
limitea, war, but lat us make it even ::iore oertain that
beyond peradventure of doubt that we have the ability in
great abundanoe to detar global war and to cope with
the eventuality should sugh a war be forced upon the...
people of this. . ..Nation.

This attitude received Republican support from Harold Osteray of

who believed that as long as

T

Ve maintain

tferw

York

a retaliatory force of unquestion-

able power, it is believed that no possible enemy would resort to an
5
all-out attaok upon the U.S** *

Refutation of thi* position came from

Republicans and Democrats alike.

Republicans Gerald Ford of Michigan

and William Bray of Indiana supported the need for more forces for

30

Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt. 7, 86th Congress, 1st Session.
June ?, 1959, pp. 9595-94.
31

Ibid.,

p.

9605

for limited war, ©specially now carriers.

Mr. Bray expressly oautioned

against the use of massive retaliation forces for limited war and warned
that conventional forces had to be increased. 32
came from Reps. £d Edmonds on of Oklahoma,
xncl

.

r.iel

Woy

Demooratio support

Anderson of Montana,

Flood of Pennsylvania.

Thus in 1959 the House seamed divided on the issue of limited war

while the Senate stood more firm for the implementation of a policy to
increase the oountry's limited war capacity.

Also, the period 1957 to

1959 showed an increase in the tempo of the debate over limited war.

This was ouused by the Lebanon and Formosa inoidents, sputnik, the

eleotion of 1958 and the Presidential election of 1960.

Generally

the Democrats in the Senate favored the increase in limited war foroes

while the Republicans remained non-committal but went along with the
Democratic majority.

In the House, opinion was more divided, with

Demoorats and Republicans often joi'hing sides.

However, as will be shown

in the next chapter, the general attitude in Congress was favorable to

limited war and to the inorease in defense forces.

dealt with words, the next vrill deal with deeds.

Ibid., up. 9G05 and 17619.

While this chapter
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Chapter V

The Debate on Limited War
Congress, the Administration, and the Budget

Chapter III hue shown that since 1957 the Administrations

toward

1

attitude

limited war and the foroes needed to oope with, such wars has

not been very clear, but has at tines seemed favorable.

This has been

shewn by statements made by ? resident Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense

MoElroy, and other Administration officials.
side of the picture.

However, this is only one

In order for these pronouncements to have any

weight attached to them, they have to be backed up by actual policy
decisions *

To say that the country needs a limited war capability is

one matter j to provide definite measures to implement this policy is

another*

'hat

will be shown in this chapter is that while the Administra-

tion has often agreed to the necessity of building up a limited war

oapability, it has tended to refuse to implement the policy to the satis-

faction of its critics, in spite of Pentagon and Congressional approval
of the policy*

Moreover, the debate over military preparedness has

become a partisan matter with the L<*mooratic Con. ress demanding and

legislating an increasing amount of defense funds which include provisions
for building up a limited war capability (more troop transport), while
the Administration, believing the defense force to be adequate, has been

more concerned with balancing the budget and with reducing arms,

•specially those suiteu for limited war.

The Administration still views

all-out war as the greatest military threat facing the country, and has
thus placed a greater emphasis on "push button' weapons, the cost of which

has prevented the development and purchase of conventional weapons

suitable for limited war purposes,

-ihile

^on f,ress, the Array, and Uavy

have also stressed the need for "pus- button" weapons,
they hay© felt

that these are not enough to maintain an adequate defense
posture.
Thus, they demand more funds for less massive weapons.

discussion will illustrate these points.

The following

In hia annual budget message to Con
e reas in January of 1968 President
/ileenhower said.

'Amerioana are determined to maintain our
ability to

deter war and to repel and decisively counter any
possible attack."
<*>wever,

"the greater increase in efficiency permit a
further reduction

in the number of military personnel.

weapons and equipment is also

!>einc

Procurement of older types of

reduced." 1

Ihese two statements

set the trend for the Adniaistrations * defense budget for the
fisoal

year 1959

(l

July |lt

>1

June 1959).

it was a budget which showed a

greater reliance on push-button weapons.

While planned expenditures for

troops anu conventional weapons, Including Jet aircraft, went down,

expenditures for miaailag and outer spaoe weapons went up.

More than

75 percent of funds allotted to weapons procurement .vould go for

weapons not even in production.
would

o

Of these funds 24 cents of every dollar

towards fissile production (as opposed to

2
15 cents in 1957).

i

cants in 1953 and

''resident ^isenhower, however, did add a condition,

whereby, 'while great or attention ia ^iven in this budget to tho forefoin,

areas (missiles, SAC), conventional warfare capabilities of the

military services are also being improved.

For example, funda are pro-

vided to initiate prcduotion of new modela of amall arms and ammunition,

standardized for use by all mambers of the Jiorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation."^

Yet the Ansy waa the only service to be allotted less funds than

President -isenhowor, budget message, fcg ^:rk ilmea , January 14, 1958
p. 17.
2

Mpr York Times , January 14, 1958,

p.

22.

President iiisenhowor, budget message, How York Tjmos , January 14, 1953
p.

17.
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it had previously received, 4 and thus was still a decade
behind the Soviets
in bringing out new families of conventional weapons.

Aetually, the defense budget ($39,779,000,000) was a record for a
peacetime budget.

This increase in military appropriations was justified

by President Eisenhower, as it was "necessary for a speedup in the

adjustment of military strategy, forces, techniques, and organisation to
lee? paoe with the rapid strides in science and technology. " 5

*et, it was

a compromise budget - a compromise **botween a continual desire for a

budget as close to balance as possible and the satellite-induced need
for

rr.ore

military expenditures,. . .between the need for strong operating

forces ready to fight tomorrow una the need for increased amounts for
future weapons,. •between the number of men and ships and planes and the

increased Mobility and firepower of recently developed weapons," and
6

"between various views of Russian strength..."

ATiile it

increased the

ocuntry's ability to retaliate against a massed nuclear attack: in the
present and in the future, it showed a continuing decrease in the country's
ability to fight limited, and especially non-nuol >ar, war.

In fact, there

were only vague references in the budget message to the need for forces
to deal with limited wars.

This can be best illustrated by expenditures

alloted to the Army forcing it to deorease its strength by one mors

division and 30,000 men, and the ^resident's supplemental appropriations

Amy

suffered a out of #163 million to a total of «8 billion
and the loss of one more dlvisonj the Air f-oroe rooeived $18.7 billion, an
increase if 295 millionj and the &avy received SjlO.S billion, an inorease
of 4273 million.
*fchile the
;

ft

President Eisenhower, oudgst message. Hew York Times , January 14, 1958,

p. 17.

Sanson Baldwin as quoted

in Mew York limes, January 14, 1958, p. 22.

.
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bill of April. 1958 for

U.4

billion in added funas for missile, air-

craft, submarine, and expanding research
in "high priority defe

programs
To highlight the partisan nature of the fight
over the budget, the

House voted for a larger budget, one which, against
Presidential desires,
would retain Army strength at 900.000 men. the National
the Army Reserves at 300,000 and the Marines at
200,000.

Guard at 400.000,
All services

were voted larger funds amounting to *212,614,000 more than
the President
has asked. 8

The Democratic Senate moreover, passed a $40 billion
defense

budget (41.6 billion more than the house had voted) ref looting a
Congressional
doubt about the nation's capacity to fight limited wars while being
able
to deter general war on the sum requested.

The added $1.2 billion were

for Increases in missile-firing submarines, jet bombers and tankers,
and troop-carrying aircraft to increase ground mobility. 9

It was felt,

therefore, by Congress that any decrease in military manpower would weaken
the ability of the country to deal with small-types of aggression.

According to senator Dennis Chaves (D.. K.M.), "ths scientists with the
button will never erase the need for the G.I." 10

Later, this appropria-

tion was out by a Senate-uouse committee to only 4815 million more than

7 The8e

2

included the spaoe project, 39 more B-52's, 26 KC-155 jet tankers,
more Polaris submarines, flew York j-imes , *ipril 4, 1S58, _?;.. i
!

:

6
ftew

*ork TLaes , Juna 26,

1358, p. 1.

Q

The SI. 2 billion included *638 million for 6 missile submarines,
$69 million for *^avy asssmlt craft, vlQ8.9 millicn for 13 more B-62's,
#11.2 million for 30 new jet tankers, and il40 million for troop transport
planes. i-tew York Times , July 31, 1958, p. 1.
10

Senator Chaves quoted in New Xork Times, July 51, 1958, p. 1.
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the President had requested,

according to a Hew York Times analysis,

the ne* funds added by CongrosB were

'a

true refleotion of the American

people's concern whether our military establishment
Is really adequate
to meet the demands of both our own defense and of our
farflung oonrait-

ments in the defense of freedom." 12

Generally, it was agreed that Congress

had shown more wisdom than tho Administration in trying to provide
a
budget which bdlanoed the nation's ability to retaliate against
total
atomic war and its ability to cope with limited war to keep them from
spreading into *orld wars.

Thus when Secretary of defease iofclroy admitted

that the Administration would frees e the #815 million in extra defense

iunde voted by Congress, strong oitioism was levelled at the Administrations

oonoept of national strategy.

Two major oritioisms raised were that the

Administration was taking too great a risk in the U30 of future pushbutton weapons at the expense of conventional weapons j and it was committing
the United States to the doctrine of massive retaliation without assuring
the ability of forces for limited war to carry out their missions. 15

The Administration responded to those oritioisms by deolaring the

United States had not lost its limited war capability, that even though
sttLnpower

was being decreased, the Army and Marines would have greater

effectiveness due to greater firepower, ami, that although limited wars

^Kew York

Times, August 7, 1958, p. 5.

* *llgw York limes
, August 9, 1958,

1S

p.

IT.

Ksw York limes, January 19, 1958, IV, p. 8.

were more deaireable than largo wars, it was the
all-out war that was
more likely if tho two great powers oUahed. 14
It thus seeded evident that the Administration,
in determining the

defense budget for the fiscal year 1859,

MM

more oonoerned with saving

money than with creating an adequate defense foroe, one that
oould oope

with any war situation, ana although more money was being spent,
the
increased money was non sufficient to offset rising costs.

The adminis-

tration showed that, although modified, massive retaliation was still
the cornerstone of American defense policyi and in spite of the desires
of Congress for a more flexible military policy, the Administration

further committed itself to the view that by increasing the oountry's
ability to fight a general war, the capability to fight limited wars

would also be increased.

14

Ibid.
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The eoonoiay-mindedness of the iisenhovrer Administration .ms carried

over to the defense budget of 1960 in much the same manner that was

evident in the budget of 1959.
of the features of the

It was to be a budget that illustrated many

"New Look* policy of 1953

—

a policy designed to

produee more powerful weapons in order to reduce military costs.

Thus,

in a press conferenoe in November 1, 1958 President -dsenhower indioated

that the armed services could have their oostly missile systems, but at
the expense of existing weapons systems.

Hi warned that these new weapons

would have to displace rather than supplement the existing systems in
order to prevent the rise of a "garrison-state " in which the military,
by using most of the economy, would be able to influence all political

decisions.

He told newsmen,

*we have got to do some good, hard-work

thinking on the thing, and not just pile one weapon and one system on

another and so in the Ion? run break ourselves.

°

La tor that month

Secretary «*c£lroy voiced practically tha same opinion when he stated,
'what we've got to do now is to ma.<e a scientific judgment and appraisal

of program* that have become marginal in the light of increased knowledge
wlS
that ha 8 come from a year's experience with test programs."

Ihese statements Indioated that the defense budget for Fiscal Year
1950 would moan more austerity for the military.

Although it would

probably carry an inorac.se in expenditures, it was believed that it would
oe just sufficient to ocver the increased costs caused by inflation and

the growing complexity of weapons systems.
and missilos "would have to give."

17

Because of this, both manpower

Before the "resident's budget message

^President Elsenhower, press conference, New York Times , November
1958 # p. 13.

^Secretary of Defense
November 29, 1958, p. 1.

-ioiilroy,

press conference, New

lor-:

limes,

5,

•
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there were indications that he would seek

ohallenged by the Democratic Congress,

HO

billion in arms, a figure

Senator Lyndon Johnson seened to

voioe the dominant opinion when he said that he was "deeply eonoerned
and somewhat disappointed to observe th*t in the field of military pre-

parations they (the Administration^ are programming as if they were
living in a static world rather than an exploding, expanding, and developing
••18

world,"

Thus, it seemed that Congress would probably "chart its

own

course" in spending for missiles and limited war capabilities.
In his budget messago of January 1959, President

-isenhovrer more

or less confirmed the opinions of many democratic congressmen,

^e

declared, "The objective of our defense effort today is the same as it
has been in the past

—

to deter wars, large or small.

To achieve this

objeotive we must have a well-rounded military foroo, unuer unified direction and control, properly equipped and trained, and ready to respond
to any type of military operation that may be forced upon us.

fle

have

such a force now, and under this budget we will continue to have suoh a

force,

To emphasise this now turn towards a more flexible military

force, the budget brought forth a new olatsif loation for the armed

servioes.

Expenditures were broken down for a strate^lo foroe (SAC,

Atlas Missiles, tactical Army, Marine, and Air loroe units, mobile carrier
task forces, and Polaris submarines), an air defense foroe, sea oontrol

forces, and taotical forces ("tactioal elements of ground, naval, and

air forces to deal with situations short of -eneral *ar or to carry out
tasks in the event of general war')
18

fc>onator

20

ilowever,

Johnson, speech, New Xork Tines , January G, 1359, p. 1.

President Eisenhower, budget message.
^New York

provisions for the

Mew

Times, January 20, 1S59, p. 17,

'iork

Times , January 20, 1959, p. 17
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organitation and use of these foroes was not indicated,
nor were the
tactical foroes well-defined, and although it seemed
as If the Administralon

had finally realised the need for suoh functional
grouping, there was
no indication that it was anything more than a paper
designation.

Ac was expected, the main emphasis of the budget was upon
missiles
and long-range nuclear weapons, and although it was another reoord
budget
($40,945,000,000) oalling for an increase in the long-range missile
systems, this was done at the expense of proposals to enhanoe the country

ability to fight limited wars.

1

•

According to ^resident Eisenhower, "this

budget assures that essential defense needs are met.

1,21

This meant

increased funds for the Atlas and Titan ICBM's, Jupiter and Thor IRBM *,
1

-ainuternan IOBM, and Solaris missil©3,

aircraft missiles
i

—

satellites, lunar probes, and anti-

"the more advanoed and promising weapons systems."

urthennore, beoause the armed services would have "signif ioantly

greater combat power as new weapons continue to be added to inventories, nZ2
there would be no significant increase in manpower, but for the first
time sinoe the end of the Korean War there was no decrease in Army or

Marine strength,

iiaoh

service oven obtained more funds, although the

Anny felt that its share was not enough to allow it to start its five

year $15 billion modernization program.

And, although the

Amy

remained

at fourteen divisions, the Strategic Army Corps was reduced from four to

three divisions, two of which were at full strength.
In summary, it was a budget which theoretically reduced numbers and

increased power

j

it was characterized by an effort to produce the maximum

from every defense dollar spent j it followed the 196S budget in formi
21

President Eisenhower, budget message,

1969, p. 17,
22
B

Ibid.

mm

iork Times , January 20,

00

it waa unacceptable to Congress *nd tho armed servioos.

Although secretary
adequate

anv!

.'oi-lroy

declared that the defense foroea wore

the oountry waa ia a position "not to fight the general

war, hut to he in shape to win it, so the othsr follow won't initiate
it,"

an.i

that

V©

are in that position now and will bo in that position

for the years under discussion

I

through 1962),

doubts raised as to the adequacy of the budget.

thsre wore serious

The first doubts ewce

from the Joint Chiefs of 3taf f via written memoranda to Congress stating
their reservations,
General Taylor of the

Ihe greatest criticism, at was expected, cane from

Any*

His reservations to the budget centered

around funds for modernitat ion, the « ike-Zeus missile, parsonnel strength,
and the Array's surface- to-air missilj program.

He waa particularly

annoyed at the lack of funds for tactical equipment and missiles, forces
needed to fight limited wars,

as a result he felt that the Array would

be unable to carry out its assigned missions.
flavy

and tho Air

t

The memoranda from the

broe were similar in their demands for more funds.

It

must be noted, however, that all the other Chief a endorsed the §40,8
billion oudgotj their reservations wore in rerard to the funding for varieus
4

>art8 of their reapeotive aerrice program* 0 and it waa only the -rmy that

am* demanding an overall increase in funds.

Secretary
24

of fefen** MoXlroy,

*tew

It also must be realiied that

York limes , Jebruary 4, 1959, p. 3.

Taylor, op, oit. , p. 66. General Taylor stated that in the area of
fund a for the purohuse of now equipment, which oontrola tha rate of
modernisation, the Air ioroe reoeived 60$ of all available resources,
the i%ry and Marine a 50;« and the Army 10>,
26

I6itt.

SI

these memoranda might have been -resented for politioal
reasons

—

to

try to get aore funds froa Congress,

further doubts were raised hy various senators, among; thea Jaoob
^avits
H.Y.), -Ulan

i^l

lender

(fife,

I*.), and Sites Ksfauver

{Kg Tenn.), who

ohided ^resident Eisenhower for putting budget values ahead of defense

values* 26

Later, the ^©nato took action against the Administration's

desire to out the strength of tho

Amy

and Marine ^orps by attaching

riders to the supplementary money bill deaandin

the Marines be maintained

at ?00,000 and the Army at 900,000 by threatening to tie up all Army and

^avy funds unlass the wishes of ^ongress wore followed*

27

According to

••aator Paul Douglas of Illinois, this was no time to "reduce our capacity
to fight liaited wars." ?&

The House responded to this by actually cutting the Administration's

request for

nerar

money by one percent, although more money w*s given tc

the missile pro, ram and to the Ajnay (an added lUNf nil lion) for modernisa-

tion*

*

Although this was substantially the s&ma amount asked by the

President, there was a different emphasis placed on its distribution.
This was followed by tho Senate Appropriations -iostiittes request for a

^39*7 billion spending bill, placing a greater emphasis on both longrange missiles and forces for limited warfare*

26

Hew fork limes , ^aroh lo, 1959, pp*
Senate Preparedness subcommittee*

1

Included were more funds

and 2*

Hearings before the

27

The riders were sponsored by ittko «*ansfield and Russell Long*
York Times , May 1, 1959, p* 2*

?8

Senator Paul Douglas,

fork Tines , May 1, 195S, ?. 2*

Hew Yora limes, May 50, 1959, p.

U

82
to keep the Marines at 200.000, *nd funds
for a nuclear super carrier. 30

The bill was unanimously approved by tho Senate
and was *775 million

more than had been approved by the House.

A compromise was reached by

the House and Senate cutting the bill to $59.2 billion,
which was only

lift! million under the ^residential request, but with a greater emphasis
on Army and Marine ^orps. modernisation and long-range missiles. 31

Thus

Congress was able to override budget estimates in order to ooncentrate

sore funds upon strengthening ground forces to meet the challenges of
limited, local wars, ana to place a greater emphasis on missiles.

This

attitude also emphasised the growing battle between the Administration

and a Democratic ^onrress ever whether tho defense spending desired by
the Administration was for the right purposes.

The stated amounts were $380 million for the supercarrier, »43
million for the marines, and *400 million more for Army modernisation
and the Nike-£*tf* missile. I»ew Yor«c ii.aes, July 2, 1959, p. 9.
3l

*ork Times, August 1, 1959, pp. 1 and 7. The Air Force received
$17 billion, the Amy *9.3 billion, the Navy #11 billion and the Department of Defense, &1.3 billion.
inew

Thus a tawnd of austerity was

regard to the defense budget.

establish

by the .idministration with

Although each budget was larger than the

one preoeding it, it was evident that the increases were just ably
to

cover the costs of present and past bills allowing little to be left over
for the procurement of new arms and equipment. The causes of this

.tore

There was the heavy hand of the Bureau of the Budget and the

;sany.

Administration's desire for a "level budget, "

Expenditure limitations

was place a on the services regardless of how much Congress decided to
fpend.

An example of this were the funds withheld in the 1960 budget

to keep the Marine Corps at ?O0,OO0.

servioes f rom ^demising. There were

These ceilings prohibited the
ttlso

inflation and past undor-

•stlnation of costs by the Administration which helped keep the budget

below the level sought by Congress and the armed services.

According to James Reston of the

^e.v

ior.<

f

:

cs,

"the planners in

the .'entagon wore more interested in balanoing Russian power than

balancing the budget, but conservatives in the Administration are detor1 9

mined to keep it down.

1

*

The attitude of Secretary of the Treasury,

Robert Anderson and Secretary of Defense Neil

-io'&lroy

had been that a

sound financial base is needed for military security, hence the desire
to keep defense spending at a minimum.

Furthermore, the Mminietration

had boon conducting a "peace program" and any

build-up would tend to

arras

destroy the image it had been trying to present.

The Administration was

*Hew York Times, October 1, 1959, pp. 1 and 44.
5

Ja.n©8 Reston,

hew York 'limes, November 13, 1959, p. 10.
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det.mlnBd to b.
sibility.

iwplrt

a. tta party of p W0 . . nd

fl8Wl rs

This, of oourse. was in direct
contradiction to

>entagon

planners (except the Air toroe) who
saw the need of carrying both
a
strategic and a tactical force
regardless of the additional cost.
Thua. in November of 1959 the Resident
set a
on the defense budget.

Hi

billion ceiling

He warned that the United States
should be on

guard aot to spend money hysterically on
new weapons.

According to hin,

the country was "trying to do many things
that are not completely necessary
*e said he would rather liquidate the national
debt and develop a balanced

budget.

It was evident that in the budget of
1961 there would be even

less funds for limited war in spite of
Administration-expressed realisation
of their need.
In his State of the Onion message President
Eisenhower painted an

optimistic picture of the country's defense forces as
boing sufficient to

deter any arrressor from waging all-out war, and he declared
that "to

meet situations of less than general nuclear war, we oontinue
to maintain
our carrier forces, our many service units abroad, our always
ready

Army Strategio Forces and -*arine Corps divisions, and the civilian
oonponents.

The continuing modernisation of these foroes is a oostly

but neoeesary proooss, and is scheduled to go forward at a rate which

will steadily add to our strength."36

j

Theee two themes that military and economic strength

<fre

inseparable

and that the United states has sufficient general and limited war troops
1

M ibid.
35

1.1

.

J

President -iisenhower, press conference, Aew York Tjqee , December 3 #

195G, p. 18.
36

,

President Eisenhower, State of the Union -essage, New
January 8 # 1960, p. 10.

Yuri.
•;.

]

Umes ,

and equipment were plainly evident in the President's budget
message of

January It* I960.

The ^resident proposed a $40, £96,000,000 budget
which

provided for more battlefield rockets us well as IC33»e. yet was
only

60

million more than the previous year's budget.

As in the past.

President Eisenhower reiterated the need for forces able to meet all
contingencies.

He said that;

•••strategy and tactics of the united States military
foroes are now undergoing one of the reates transitions
in history. The change of emphasis from conventional -type
to missile-type warfare must be made with care, mindful
that the one type of warfare cannot be safely neglected
for the other. Cur military foroe must be capable of
contending successfully with any contingency that nay be
foroed upon us, from limited emergencies to all-out war.
To accomplish this object personnel strength wus to reraain the same

with 2,489,000 in the aotive service.

Also, the functional designations

established in the budget message the previous year were a^.ain used.
Of special interest was the makeup of the "tactical re roes.

'

e

^'resident

called for more funds for modernisation and improvement in the effective nes8 of these forces by improving the firepower and mobility of the

fourteen Army and three Marine divisions with more NATO ammunition-fired
rifles and machine guns, --GO tanks, &-113 armored personnel carriers,

self-propelled howitzers and a new family of other self-propelled

non-nuclear artillery, more battlefield missiles for close range fire
support, a thirty-five poroent increase in Army aircraft, more tactical

aircraft for the Air Foroe, and more

^rine Aircraft.

38

Thus for the

first tine a Presidential budget message showed a disposition to build

President Usenhower, budget

message,

flew

York limes , January 19,

1960, p. 18,

^President's budget message,

jg

Vork Times, January 19, 1960, p, 18.

up the country's limited war forces.

out

(M|

This was further shown by the
first

million) ever suffered by the Air Force,
followed by increases

39
for the »avy ($112 million) the Army
($84 million).

Furthermore,

the outbacks made in the budget were
suffered in the general war

capability area

~

the 3-70, supercarrier. and the
Nike-Zeus missile.

Even though the budget seemed to tase notice
of the oountry'e

need for limited war forces, as well as general
war forces, there was
strong oritioism directed toward it because the
increases made were
felt to be too modest.

Although the percentages that go to the services

shifted slightly for the first tlue since the "Kew
Look" in 1954, 40

there was no major shift in allocations, and the increases
made were
felt to be adequate again to cover only past and present
bills.

Also,

oriticism was directed toward the Bureau of the Budget for keeping
the
spending oeilings oelow a feasible level.

This was denied, however,

the Secretary of Health, education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming, who

stated,

"I

am convinced that Dwight Eisenhower will never permit any

considerations

—

including fiscal considerations

—

to stand in the way

of our continuing to deal with the foroes cf international Communism

from a position of strength rather than weakness.*41

The armed services

also expressed their dissatisfaction with the budget, although these
39

''"The

Air Force still received the largest share, *18.6 billionj

the wavy 11.6 billion; the Army, 9.3 billion, and the Dept. of Defense,
1.3 billion. New *ork Tjaas , January 19, 1960, p. 2.

40

The -rt.ray^ share cf the budget amounted to 23. 5> (23/b in 1959),
the "avy 30>£ (25> in 1959) and the Air Force 44?J (46j£ in 1959),
ilaneon Baldwin, flew York Timos , January 21, 1960, p. 9.
41

Arthur I'lemming, Mew York Times, February 13, 1960,

p.

4.

\
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criticisms may have come from the pressure of competition for
funds

rather than any genuine oritioism of the strategio polioy.
In keeping with its actions of the past two years, Congress
again

proceeded to alter the budget without significantly changing the sums.
The House Appropriations Committee bill provided for more SAC bombers
in the air, more transport planes, and more nuclear submarines.

This

might have been very significant had not the Administration suddenly
added an extra $1,5 billion to the budget to give more attention to

increasing the airlift. Army modernisation, maintenance to the National
Guard and Reserves, more F-106 interceptors, and more funds for the

Minuteman ICBM program. 42

The final douse bill came to only *121 million

more than the ^resident had requested and inoluded more funds for planes,
submarines, satellites, army modernization.

HO. 3 billion

Later the Senate passed a

defense appropriations bill, a full billion dollars more

than the House had requested.
the nsw tought line taken by
for such an increase.

The failure at the Summit conference and
:i

r.

Khrushchev seemed to have accounted

Aocording to Senator Dennis Chavez (D., H.M.)

who presented the bill to the Senate, 'There can be no price tag on

43
defense."
and

«i40

These funds included $90 million more for Army modernization

million to increase the Marines to 200,000 men.

This overall

increase was subsequently out to *55C million by a Senate-House committee

which deleted the funds for the Marines and raised Army modernization funds
to

,

200 million more than the original Administration request.

42

43

44

Kew York Times, April 30, I960, p. 1.
Senator ENsnnis Chavez, Senate speech, New York

1960, p. 1.
^i.'ew York Times, June 26,

1960, pp.

1

and 28.

'i'imes ,

Juno 17,
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The study of these tnree budgets has pointed out many weaknesses and

problems faced by the nation's leaders in planning for a defense force

able to meet all contingencies, from local wars to all-out war.
doctrine of massive retaliation

lias

The

to be a primary component of the

country's strategic concept, but, as has been pointed out, it does not

provide the total answer for the country's defense needs*

Yet the

country*s planners are faced with the problem of providing funds which

will anable the nation to meet other limited war contingencies without
weakening; its ability to detor or fight general war .

The above discussion

has shown Congress to be willing to legislate funds to meet these con-

tingencies, while the Administration desires to maintain itself as the
"party of peace * and to present a "level budget" and thus has refused to
use the extra funds •

The major area that has suffered from this dilesnxoa is

the area of weapons procurement*

Many of the weapons of the Army, ^avy,

and Air Force used for conventional and limited warfare are rapidly

becoming obsolete without sufficient funds being available to replace
thesu.#ouoh procurement has to increase at a rate equal to personnel
roduotions oallsd for by the Administration, or else the Administration's

claim that troop reductions are being met by increases in mobility and
firepower will be a mere hollow claim.
Not only has the Army failed to receive sufficient funds for moderni-

sation and procurement of new weapons, but its mobility has been severiy

hampered by the Administration's refusal to allocate more funds for the

Military Air Transport Service and the Davy's amphibious fleet.
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The Administration has countered those
criticisms by citing the
successes of the Lebanon and other operations
which show that the nation
has a very considerable capability to "react
with strength* to limited
threats on a Tory small scale.

This may bo true at present, but it is

something to consider for the future when the increasing
obsolescense of
the Army and i4arine f s equipment reaches a critical
]&>voi.
The other problem brought out by this study has been
the partisan

nature of the debate itself.

The Administration, striving for a balanoed

budget and a strong, stable currency and balance of payments, has
been
determined to keep the budget within definite limits, while Congress, more
intent on actual defense values, has tried to raise it to take ear© of
all contingencies.

Thus, while the Administration has ar'oaitted the need

for forces capable of meeting limited war threats effectively but has

refused to do anything about it. Congress has tried to sae that this
capability is realised.

One thing is certain, however,

The deterrent

policy of the Administration has been sufficient to prevent any "hot wars"
involving the united states from occurring up to the present time, and

without specific figures on the numbers of atomic warheads available, it
is difficult for the average Amerioan to say whether or not the funds

called for by the Administration are in reality insufficient,

^any of

the arguments offered by the oritios are partisan and often hysterical,
an-'

thus

tens;,

to cloud the issues.

However, if the views of the military

leaders themselves can be taken at face mlue, they indicate that the
services are deficient in thj area of modernisation, and this will pose a
grave problem for defense planners in the future.

•
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Chapter VI
Conclusion

The main focus of this study has been the roactionoof the Ariaed
Services, Congress, and the Administration toward the need to build
up

forces to deal with situations short of all-out war, or limited, war.

Thfe

does not imply the recognition of a ootrine of limited w*rj in fact, there
is a great difference between a doctrine of limited

to deter or fight limited *ars.

Foreign ?olioy) 9*4

Henry Kissinger

(

war and i capability

Nuclear

'.teapots

und

vobert Osgood (Ljgdted ffar ) while calling for the

adoption of & strategy flexible enough to neet all contingencies, have
also demanded the inclusion of a definite doctrine of limited war in

American military strategy.

This doctrine actually calls for the use of

fcf as an instrument of national polioy.

according to Kissinrer, *it

is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our foreign involvezneiits

that we should hare coae to consider limited war as an aberration

from the 'pure* case and that we have paid little attention to its
strate: io opportunities.

Similarly, Osgood has stated that

Ha

the

use of anaed force as an instrument of national policy no greater force
should be employed than is necessary to achieve the objectives toward

which it is direated#*2

In this way the so-called doctrine of limited

war becomes an offensive strategy to gain specific limited objectives.
This strategy is entirely contrary to traditional American thinking, as

defense policy has always been of the defensive nature, and although the

^Kissinger, op. cit
2

.,

p. 117.

c,ood, op, cit ., p. 18
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President has the power to declare war, it would
undoubtedly be politically
(and possibly constitutionally) impossible to
declare war, If there

wore no specific case of aggreesion Involved.

It

is this characteristic

of the doctrine put forth by Kissinger and 0 8good that
ls aomawhat object-

ionable and unrealistic as a definite policy to be followed by
the United
States.

As the leader of the free world and a ohampion of the principles

of tho United Hatione. the United States would be a hypocrite if it used

war. Halted or otherwise, to accomplish its airs.

One if the principles

behind the United Nations is a desire to settle all disputes peacefully

without resorting to violence.

The use of armed force to gain one's ends

except as a last resort or as an emergency measure would be contradictory
the principle and would thus cause the United States to lose stature

among its allies and its potential allies in the uncommitted bloc of
nations.
On the other hand, the maintenance of an effootive capability to

deter or fight limited wars implies a defensive strategy whioh is capable
to mooting limited forms of aggression, but not initiating aggression,

as is implied In the dootrlne of alasin~er and Osgood.

Vhis type of

strategy is both politically sound and feasible, for It ocmplnnents the

strata^- of massive ratal iation and jives the United States an ability
to meet all situations requiring the use of foroe.

It is this i'uetor

that has been the foous of this study,
:-ne

of the difficulties that has developed from this study has

been the fact that it is hard to define just what constitutes limited war,
for in order to build up a capability, the definition of what it is the
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capability will deal with, mutt be determined.

Ideally, a limitod war

hat been viewed a. a war confined as
to area, targets, weapons, manpower,

time, and tempo, but is unlikely that so many
Initiations oould be

imposed or maintained simultaneously.

What is likely is that it would bo

limited mainly as to area and weapons.

Still, a war limited as to area

and weapons oould take on a multitude of forms
varying from guerilla

aotions to the clash of modern arms.

It might result from Communist

•upport of indigenous revolutions, intervention of Communist
"volunteers"
in a war between two small states, uirsot invasion across a
well-defined

boundary, or wars occurring among small states that do not
involve direct

Communist participation. 0

To bo able to re^ct to these varied types of

wars is the goal of a polioy whioh affords a flexible capability.
Thus limited war itself has come to take on a naw moaning.

The

limited war of the 18th and 19th centuries is ontirclj different from
the limited war of the future.

The wars of the 16th and 19th oenturies

were waged by all foroes and were limited as to technology, forces available, balance of power, and moral restraints.

In contrast, the

Halted

*ars that may occur in the future may not be limitod by technology, moral

restraints, and manpower i nor will they be used as instruments of national

polioy by all nations.
Ihis uncertainty about the form limited wars may take has led to the

problem of defining what constitutes

•

capability to deal with these wars.

The critics of the Administrations defense policies have maintained that
a flexible force is needed to meet those limited situations and still

maintain an ability to deter fcneral war.

Osgood, op. clt .,

.».

237.

A wide range of capabilities.
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it has been argued, would enable
the United States to deter or fight
any

type of war, and thus free other resource,
for economic

build up depressed nation..

anrf

social aid to

In the word, of Secretary of the

Broker, "developing appropriate military strength

I**

tfilber

to oope with the whole

apeotrum of thi* peril (the use of lesser forms
of aggression by the
Communist*) Is not a simple matter of choosing
between the ii-boab and the
rifle #

Kathor, it is a matter of maintaining balanced
forces oapable of

responding properly to all situations

~

those that require the il-bomb

or the rifle, or any othar situation in between."4

The Administration

has lon^ maintained this to be its policy; the difficulties
have lain in
its implementation*

The adoption of a flexible policy is difficult beoauso its oonoept
is

vague and therefore has led to the emergence of many different oonoepta,

all pur porting to aooomplisn the saae onds.

The

Amy

has lonr maintained

that it offers the best moans to deter or fight limited wars ano therefore
it should get prime attention.

Y t

".-hen

thej

bureau of the audgft initiated

a proposal to deprive the Ariay of its general war mission and bring back

at least two divisions from ovarsea* on the grounds that ainoo the Army

felt itself to be the ideal force for dealing with limited wars, it
should restrict itself to that by reducing its continental air defense

propram and overseas deployment for general war, the Army was outraged
and complained this would ohanf-e the Army's mission as set by law/
^reover, the Army has felt that it needs more divisions, fully armed and

trained, more speed and mobility, and more funds to replace obsolete weapons
and equipment.

Indicative of the results achieved by the Army was

^Secretary of the Any >lilber Bruoker, speech, quoted in Mew York
November 15, 1909, p. 18.
fyew York

'lime a, fioveaber 15,

1969, p. 1.

tij *es ,

S4

General Taylor's retirement as Chief of Staff in
the middle of 195G.

In

answer to the question of why ho retired, he stated;

I

"For four years

huve struggled to modernize the Army and my success was
limited.

decided

I

So I

would do one thing for the country and withdraw an obsolescent

general from the inventory,
The ^avy has also developed a concept to fight limited and
general

war, and has even sided with the Army.

The Navy vie»s itself as the Ideal

force for dealing with limited wars through its ability to transport and
support the

-U:-ii;e

-J

or pa in limited war situations.

ia felt, was proved in the Lebanon crisis.

This capability, it

Also, its Polaris submarines

and super carriers could be used for both limited and general wars.

The Air

f

orce has taken the opposite view, that the prime deterrent

for any t ype of war is a nuclear retaliatory force capable of destroying
any possible enemy with a minimum of destruction to the United States.
Thus, the current military thinking may be divided into two views 1

The Strategio/tactioal view and the tactical/strategic view.
is taken mainly by the

Army and the

Nav;,

ihe latter

and most of Congress, while the

former view ia held by the Air Force and many Administration officials,

although there are different points of view within the services themselves.
The tactical/strategio adherents view future war as economic and political

penetration, possibly, followed by the use of force by the enemy to secure

limited objectives.

For this reason they

equipped to meet this threat are needed.

f««Jl

that forces t«ained and

The holders of the opposite

opinion view any future war as all-out with an air strike at the souroes
of strength of the West.

Thus the United states will have to be prepared

General Maxwell Taylor, press conference, Hew York
1S59, p. 8.

'i'imcs ,

June 26 #
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to launch an anticipatory attack of its own or
be prepared to retaliate

against tho first blow.

The tactical/strategic adherents call for
the

use of tactical nuoloar weapons j their opposite* viow only
those weapons
of the highest yield as the most f easible.

The tactical/strategic adherents

seek a sileaole troop life, the strategic-tactical group minimize
it.

The

tactical/strategic group asks for aircraft carriers; thoir adversaries,
submarines.

Lastly, the tactical/strategic group sees the need for a large

defense budget to initiate a flexible policy, while the strategic/tactical

adherents desire to limit the budget by determining the best weapons
system and than putting all funds into its development.
concepts have

ocaae

These

coitfliotin,?;

about because of the increasing limits being placed

on the funds available to the services.

As noted in Chapter

IV, the

defense budget sinoe 1958 has increased only enough to cover past and
present bills and the results of inf iationi it has not been sufficient to

allow the services to develop all the programs which they desire.

This

has caused a competition for x*unds which has caused conflicting concepts
to arise.

As a result, it has been felt that the lower priority projects,

those for limited war, have been neglected.
Con,

ress has generally taken the liberal viewpoint just discussed,

while tho Administration has remained in the middle of the road.

Congress

has continually appropriated more money to build up linited war forces,

and the Administration has chosen to withhold them from use.

^resident

Eisenhower has maintained that by "concentrating our efforts on the more

advanced and

siore

promising weapons systems, we oun increase substantially

the corabat capabilities of our military forces with a relatively small

Gavin, op. cit., pp. ?50-2Sl.

OS

increase in the overall cost of defease, " 8

This implies a policy not tied

to one weapons system, but one which does
restrict military spending

one of the requisites of the liberals 1 proposals.

—

The administration

has voiced approval of a flexible policy, but has
chosen its own means
to implement it.

It has leng maintained that the United States
has

enough foroes for limited wars, and that the host way to
deal with small

wars is to create allied foroes, 'principally ground forcos,
numbered in
the millions, with a C reat capability.

Thus, it is unnecessary to use

American foroes to fight these limited wars.

This accounts for the

military aid to NATO, tttiN| CENTO, and OAS states.

However, it does

not solve the problem of the unoommitted nations, some of whom have asked

for military aid and have not received it, as was the

or.se

in Guinea.

The difficulty to determining what constitutes an adequate limited

war capability has been increased by the appearance of nuclear weapons
especially missiles.

—

The Administration has placed a high priority on

nuolear missiles and the defense budgets showed them to have precedence
over other weapons systems.

However, as of the budget for 1961, the

Administration provided missiles to be used on the battlefield, thus
subscribing to the theory that limited ground wars can be fought with

nuolear weapons of low

yfeld.

Even so, the ^rmy has been fighting what it

calls a stampede to produce ICBM*s anc

ot,;ier

weapons designed for nuolear

war and has called for a step-up in the production of conventional weapons
to counter the Soviet increase in conventional power

President -isenhower, budget message, New York
195S, p. 16.
8

—

new tanks, self-

1'imes ,

January 20,

Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarlee, quoted in New

July 7, 1958, p.

IS*.

'I'ork

Ti nes ,

•
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propelled guns, tracked rocket guns, mortars, assault
amphibians, new
small aras^eto. 10

This attitute was looked up by a department of defense

report In June of 1958 whloh stated that, "Soviet military
authorities
havo categorically rejected the concept of a conflict in which
low yield

atomio weapons could be employed without aithor oombatent resorting
to
the most powerful weapons in his arsenal.
of

Hit Admiral Charles

1,11

Then there was the statement

Srown, in which he declared.

"I

would not recommend

the use of atomic weapons no Matter how small, when both sides have the

power to destroy the world.

1?
*

Thus, it has been argued that a build up

of conventional weapons is the best way to deal ?/ith limited wars; while

others, including the Aamini strati on, maintain that low yield battlefield

nuclear weapons are necessary to counter the larger number of ^omcamist
forces,

doth sides agree that it is necessary to have a limited war

capability, yet neither can agree as to what constitutes an eff active
capability.
It is the doctrine of massive retaliation that has received the most

criticism in this debate*

Henry Kissinger has noted that "if the Soviet

bloc can present its challenge in 1 ss than all-out war, it may gain a
crucial advantage,

kvory aov3 on its part will then pose the appalling

dile;nma of whether wc arc willing to oomait suicide to prevent encroachment,

none of which seems to threaten our existence directly, but which may be a
step on the read to our ultimata destruction.'

13

Ihis same opinion was

also voiced by Governor Robert ^yner of ^ow Jersey who stated*

Bcw York limes , December

^New

2, 1957,

"Whenever

pp. 1 and 20.

York -^imea , June 8. 1958, p. 19

12

/ioe Ada. Charles 3rown, speech, quoted ia Sew York Times , October 8,
1958, A< 12.
[

lv

I*t>in, or,

o,.».

eit ., p. 11.
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the Soviet union or one of its satellite states is
willing to undertake
the risks of military aggression, direot or indireot,
we cannot any longer

afford to

b<;

in the position of having no ohoioe exoept to run
for cover

or risk blowing up the entire world." 14

These oritios have implied that

the doctrine of massive retaliation offers only two alternatives
in the

oase of Soviet agression.

This seems to be an unjustifiably criticism,

as the iobanon crisis and the Quemoy incident did not result
in either

the United States running for oover or starting a nuclear war.

Further-

more, an armed force (excluding reserves) of 2.4 million men indicates
that there are troops available to fight limited wars,

tthat

these

oritios have failed to see is that while higher priority has been ^iven
the nuolsar retaliatory force, other forces have remained in being to

cope with other possible situations.

This is not to say, however, that

the doctrine of massive retaliation does not deserve criticism.

By

placing so high a priority on the nuclear retaliatory foroe, the Administration, although maintaining a large foroe, has not been able (or has not
felt it neoessary; to provide sufficient funds to replace obsolete

weapons and equipment used by the armed forces.

Only if this is done,

can the Administration truly admit that its strategy is one of complete

ilexiUlity.

In order to accomplish this task, either of two alternative!

must be followed,

either the

Jtu4ida

for the nuclear deterrent be cut

down and the funds thus freed used to build up the capability to deter
or fight limited wars, or the budget be increased to accommodate the

modernization program,

either alternative will meet criticism, but the

Gov. Robert iieyner, speeoh quoted in Hew York ^iaes , April 24, 1969,
p. 14.
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modernisation program has to bo accomplished if the tactical
foroea are
to bo a realistic element in the future.

Thus.

th-i

main theme behind this study is not that the linited States

must adopt a policy which favors the use of limited war as an
instrument
of national policy, but that the administration

just realistically view

itw own strategic doctrine in a proper perspective,

for, although it has

aaintained that our strategic doctrine is flexible, it has in faot failed
to implement this policy to provide for adequate capabilities to meet

all type* cf possible military aggression.

actually, the administration

has a choice between two contrasting military postures, each of which is

expensive.

"The one, concentrating upon strategic air power as the

deterrent, would economise on tactical

capability deterrent, woul

.

arras

j

th-s

other, stressin

•

.

.

I

-

economise on air defense for our civilians." 15

oy outtin;: down on the huge costs of protecting A-ioriean cities anc using

these funds to protect SAC bases adequately and develop tactical foroes,

an adequate deterrent would result,

will have to take measures to prevent
1A.T0 area, and to b^

furthermore, the Administration
>vars

from spreading outside the

prepared to fight smaller wars in the Middle 3ast

and the Soviot-Sino periphery (Iran to Korea).
grounc; foroes,

This would entail added

new and diversified low-yield nuclear weapons, new ground

and airborao equipment for mobile, tactical operations, an adequate

system of conventional weapons, the maintenance of strategic retaliation
capabilities, and forces for total war.

This would comprise a truly

flexible military policy, one which provided for a capability for fighting

both all-out wars and limited wars.

Malcolm hoag, 'Cost cf a dual capability,
March-April, 1968, p. 324.
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